

GCE History HY3

Unit HY3 involves the submission of an extended essay of between 3,000-4,000 words. The essay is an independent investigation into an issue of historical controversy arising from the chosen depth study. A particular focus is on explaining how and why different historical interpretations are formed. This will involve discussion of the general historical debate surrounding the chosen issue and also a consideration of the evidence which may be of value in forming a particular interpretation.

In this resource, a blank version of the answer is accompanied by an annotated version. Click on the + sign in the left hand pane to access the annotated example.

OER Template _ Question

Q1

Charles I was more responsible for the outbreak of the Civil War.

How valid is this assessment of the outbreak of the civil war?

"Charles I was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war."

How valid is this assessment of the outbreak of the civil war?

Whigs, Tories and Revisionists; these are the three schools of thought I will be reviewing and then will analyse each of the schools view on which of the two parties during the 1600s were more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war, Charles I or Parliament. I will then give my conclusion to sum up all the evidence I have supplied to support my answer to the underlying question. Charles I may have started the civil war through his attempt on the five members but Charles' hand was forced by parliament as individuals in parliament were continually attacking the crown's prerogative to strengthen their own position throughout the kingdom, this meant Charles I was forced to start the civil war by addressing the situation on hand by the only means he knew and saw fit.

The Whig school of thought believed that a civil war between the two parties was an inevitable outcome in the 17th century as the clash between these two parties was a means for England to become a true democracy and achieve true Protestantism. They apply Darwin's theory of evolution and social Darwinism to the evolution of the English government from authoritarian rule of the middle ages such as the Tsars of Russia 1600 – 1917 to a semi-constitutional government in the 19th century such as the recent constitutional monarchy of Bhutan.

S.R Gardiner views the English civil war as a puritan revolution as he believed that parliament was challenging the repressive monarchy and its religion this prepared the kingdom and paved the way for toleration of religion and so was the natural ally of the common people trying to preserve their rights against an autocratic monarchical power. This theory clearly represents the view that Charles was more responsible for the English civil war.

Tory's school of thought believed that the king was just defending the powers he was entitled to from god, god had given him the monarchy of England and he should only answer to god as he had divine right to rule as he saw fit. Many tory historians feel Charles was the defender of the realm and the Church of England which was being wrongly attacked by the aggressive parliament, trying to change the common religion to one of control such as a Presbyterian church and not of uniformity and holiness such as Charles attempt to reform the Church of England. The belief Tory's have in hierarchy, uniformity and justice shows they are clear opponents of Whigs and the view that Charles was the most responsible for the outbreak of the civil war.

The revisionist school of thoughts interpretation of history is that all history as it is known traditionally known may not be entirely accurate due to varying factors such as bias, history must be re-examined and historical narratives should be updated with newly discovered, more accurate and less biased information.

Revisionist historians reject the long term causes of the civil war and that it was an inevitable outcome that a civil war would occur, instead they say the main cause was the breakdown of trust between both the king, his court and parliament was the main cause. Revisionists emphasise the importance of the kings extraordinary and revolutionary changes in the late 1630s and late 1640s, changes to the government and how it was run would never be accepted by the conservative minded gentry, Lauds reformation of the church would also garner a lot of negative attention from puritans and others who thought Lauds reforms were changing the church so it was more catholic (Altar controversy). These revolutionary changes are what ultimately led to the outbreak of the English civil war.

[1]Lawrence Stone felt that the development of an *"efficient committee system"* coupled with the *"growth of the house of commons from about 300 to 500"* meant it was no longer being *"manipulated"* by the crown and its *"appointed speaker"*, this was the reason parliament strengthened to the extent where it became *"far more menacing"* for the crown to deal with. Stone

argues that parliament was becoming more self-aware of its *"control over taxation, legislation and religion"* and so *"could demand redress of grievances"* if Charles I wanted to collect taxation. Stone argued *"it was in parliament and particularly in the house of commons that the opposition built their institutional base"* and *"parliamentary leaders were beginning to emerge"* this opposition concerned Charles as it caused instances which *"happened to increase parliaments powers and diminish the capacity of the crown to control it"* such as abolition of courts of star chamber and high commission in 1641. *"The crown had trouble with this body at all times in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but slowly the nature of trouble changed and became far more menacing"*. Stone therefore believed Charles was more responsible for the outbreak of the war but it was due to his diminishing capacity to control the parliament and the increasing strength of the House of Commons. Stone also believed the strengthening of parliament led to parliament no longer being manipulated by the crown which entail led to leaders of the opposition emerging i.e. John Pym as he and others *"built their careers on playing key roles in debates"* and emphasising their grievances, this led to Charles causing the outbreak of the civil war.

Lawrence Stones view on this adds strength to my assessment that Charles was not more responsible although Stone may say he is, this is because he implies parliament strengthening was why Charles could not control them. I believe Charles could not control parliament because they were taking all his abilities to control them away from him and constantly undermining the crown by banding together and attacking the kings court or Charles policies such as impeaching Strafford, they were trying to manipulate him and convert him into nothing more than a symbolic figurehead.

This View of Charles is a polar opposite of how [2] Ann Hughes portrayed him to be, Ann Hughes believed Charles was just *"an authoritarian ruler"* who did not care about his people and instead was more *"concerned with the details of his policies"*. Hughes argued Charles was *"blithely unaware of the broader political context"* of his policies. Hughes felt Charles only cared about the inner details of how his policies were formed, how he would go about reforming the church through Laudianism or his policies on taxation during personal rule, he concentrated on minute details no matter how important these details turned out to be. this fascination led to Charles being left unaware of the consequences these policies would have on his political relationship with parliament, his reformation of the church attracted attention from puritans as they felt it was converting the church to a more catholic one and did not adhere to the Elizabethan settlement, Charles was left completely unaware of this until he began the reformations as he either did not think of the broader context or was not given any advice on the matter by his advisors or parliament.

Charles was never aided by parliament in his policies and his decisions, he would not be able to understand the repercussions his actions could have if he was never told of the dangers, instead the house of commons belittled him and constantly attacked his polices without any advice or reasoning, Charles had little choice but to dissolve parliament each time as the would not aid him, be it through financial aid or advice on his policies. Parliament had no right to attack his policies as they were of no concern to parliament as creating policies were his prerogative, the attacking of the kings prerogative was just a way to make Charles insecure of his position and as a means to strengthen the overall power of parliament, this assertion of power was a means for radical MP's to try and reduce the Kings power and evidence that Parliament was more responsible for the Outbreak of the Civil War.

Parliament was created to aid the king in his policies and if needed to give the king grievances from the common people to create a better life for the kings people, Edward Hyde was a first a Critic of the king and his policies but realized that Charles' opponents in parliament had gone too far by trying to reduce the king to a figurehead and he began supporting the king, [3] Edward Hyde felt that Charles dissolving parliament as an attempt to save Buckingham from impeachment *"made the power of parliaments much more formidable"* and so strengthened parliaments power over the king

and their position against the king. In Charles saving Buckingham this was seen as proof that Buckingham was guilty for his actions, Charles was doing this out of loyalty as he believed "*there is a protection very gracious and just which princes owe to their servants*", Edward Hyde also believed in this and so agreed that he should have attempted to save Buckingham, this view angered parliament as they felt it was a way for Charles to unjustifiably obstruct justice and he was seen to shelter the accused from answering their actions. Edward believed Charles would have been in a better position of power if "*parliaments had been taught to know their own bounds by being allowed to proceed as far as they could go*". Charles should have allowed the House of Commons to only do what they were allowed to do then he should have stopped them but Charles allowing them to continue he lost his power that he had over the house and so that made parliament believe they could take further power from the king for their own, parliament's growth and their belief that Charles was abusing his prerogative right to dissolve parliament when he so wished in order to save his friends from persecution was responsible for creating tension between the two parties and ultimately led to parliament abusing their privileges to solidify their position and attacking the king until he was then forced to retaliate and cause the outbreak of the Civil War.

[4] Parliament believed in their privileges and felt they should assert them to the point of defying the king. In 1656 parliament commissioned a painting of the attempted arrest of the 5 members, this painting shows the speaker Lenthall asserting his and the parliament's privileges against Charles, it also shows many of the MP's amazed at the king entering the house of commons as no royal is allowed to. Being commissioned by parliament, it shows how they believed it was a breach of their most sacred privileges and Charles had no right whatsoever to try and attempt to arrest the 5 members of parliament as whatever they may have said in parliament could not be held against them. Parliamentary privileges were a staple of tension during this era because Charles felt it unfair parliament was trying to make away with all of his privileges, this view from parliament led to Charles feeling unjustly attacked, he believed he should do something about this to protect his position at the heart of the monarchy and the kingdom. This led to the attempt of the 5 members and the outbreak of the civil war. the commissioned painting makes the assessment that Charles was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war, knowing past events and sources of tension the painting offers up a different view that parliament were beginning to think of Charles and the monarchy as a lesser power to them and that they could do whatever they wished and no matter the consequences it did not affect them, this gives the assessment that parliament was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. Parliament had no right to attack Charles' prerogatives as he also had no right to attack the parliament's privileges but with parliament constantly attacking the King's powers he had little else to do as he was the governor of the land no them and so he needed to show authority to show parliament he was not to be trifled with.

[5] David Smith does not believe that the short term causes or the long term causes between the two parties are what led to the outbreak of the war he believed it was the conflicting relationships between the two and "*long term structural problems help to explain why a crisis of some kind befell the early Stuart monarchies*". he felt that these long term causes originated from the "*fact that each Kingdom was part of a composite monarchy*" the Stuart monarchies were in control of the whole of Britain and so had to deal with individual issues throughout England, Scotland and Ireland, the conflicts that broke out throughout these kingdoms were down to underlying conflicts each kingdom shared with one another, Scotland had a strict puritan church known as the kirk where Ireland was original Catholic and so complete uniformity as Charles wanted was difficult to achieve as the kingdoms had different ideologies, Smith argued these conflicts could "*be traced back over several decades*" Smith also argues that it is a "*highly significant point that the crisis did not come under James I but under Charles I*". This indicates David Smith still thinks Charles plays some minor role in the outbreak of the civil war and was more responsible than parliament in the outbreak.

The crisis came under the rule of Charles I and not James I because parliament had grown stronger than ever before and realised that Charles was not as strong a ruler than James I, this let parliament take advantage of Charles, they would not give Charles the subsidies and money other monarchs were given in an attempt to make their position as they would then be invaluable to the king as seen during Charles personal rule he had to convene parliament when he needed finance for the Bishops war against the Scottish. This way of solidifying their position makes them more responsible for the civil war because they undermined the king to assert themselves and in turn once the king had realised that parliament had gone too far he tried to reconsolidate his power, parliament took offence and the Civil War began.

[6] Charles pleaded his innocence and even at his speech at the scaffold of his execution he began by first insisting his innocence. Charles believed he was not the one who started the war but it was parliament, he admits encroaching upon parliaments privileges but says he did not intend to do so and parliament attacked his prerogatives first. *"they began upon me; it is the militia they began upon"* he blames parliament for the outbreak of the civil war and that they firstly attacked him and all he did which anyone would do is retaliate to protect his own prerogatives against the unjustified attack from parliament and the few radicals in the house of commons. Charles saw himself as a martyr for the people and the kingdom, he felt that parliament was the first one to commission an army to attack the other party, in the short term they were the ones to blame for the outbreak of the civil war. In the long term Parliament had also been attacking the king's prerogatives and attacking the crown. Charles acknowledges that parliament knew the militia belonged to him but parliament *"thought it was fit for to have it from me"* this is what Charles believes started the civil war *"they began these unhappy troubles, not I"*. Charles' prerogatives gave him the rule of the militia and with parliament attempting to take it from him was an attempt to strengthen their own power and gives the assessment that parliament was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war.

[7] *"You cannot believe the alteration in the opinion of the world touching his majesty". This comment by the Earl of Kellie to the Earl of Mar, marks the end of the 'honeymoon period' at the beginning of Charles' reign, and it's dated 26 July 1625, when Charles had only been four months on the throne. It marks a remarkably swift general recognition, during Charles' first year, that as a king he was not a success and that judgement is one which has never been reversed"*.

Conrad Russell concluded that Charles showed he was not a king who was going to be successful and that whatever Charles concluded in his policies or any decision, his mind would not be changed on the subject, this is evident in most of Charles' early policies as many of his policies at this stage were determined by the king and his ministers and if the commons had any problem with the policies Charles would simply dismiss their allegations, this was likely to create animosity between the two parties. This shows that Russell was implying that Charles was to blame for the outbreak of the civil war and for the tension between the two leading up to the outbreak of the civil war.

In my opinion this source also gives the impression that the parliament was more responsible for the civil war outbreak as in the source it shows that it was evident that in the kings early years he was detested by both parliament and his ministers. This distaste festered in the House of Commons and later evolved from dislike into hatred of the total monarchy. With parliament already disliking Charles they ensured his reign as monarch was hard from the beginning such as when Charles ascended to the throne in 1625 he asked the commons to grant him tonnage and poundage as the monarchs before him, much to his dismay he was only granted tonnage and poundage on an annual basis, this could be seen as an early attempt by parliament to control the kings finances and his methods of collecting money which in turn affects the policies the king can use, whether this was intentional is no matter as this created a huge rift and universal distrust between the two parties which inevitably boiled down until the outbreak of the civil war, this is reasoning to the argument that parliament was more responsible for the civil war outbreak.

[8] *"Nothing like this had ever happened before. It was the first time the House of Commons challenged the King's right to close parliament".*

This shows the magnitude of the commons' ego at this time of Charles' reign, they attempted to defy the king's orders and attack his prerogative by doing so. The members of the house began to believe they were vital in the running of the country and without them the country would erupt into sheer chaos, this convoluted view of themselves caused many MP's to become power hungry and try to take power from the monarchy and give it to themselves. The reasoning to the dissolution of parliament was that they were not giving the king what was needed and were just creating tension by disrespecting the king's policies. This justified the king's reasons to dissolve the commons and interference by the parliament was also justification, this constant interference by the commons led to Charles distrusting parliament and so he decided that his only option was to close the houses and resort to personal rule, parliament being a thorn in Charles' side is evidence they were to blame for the tension leading to the outbreak of the civil war and tells you of the amount of members of the commons who did not respect the kings authority. The parliament was attempting to remove power from Charles and so he did what he had to which was to retaliate, this happened years later when Charles had to protect his right as king to be the head of the army and thus started the outbreak of the civil war.

[9] The painting by Andrew Carrick Gow shows the ferocity the house of commons were willing to go to ensure that parliament would not be closed in 1629, this gives proof that parliament were willing to do what they believed was necessary to ensure that their positions of power were safe and so gives evidence that when Charles did not accept the nineteen propositions which included the commons taking full control of the army from Charles and therefore leading to Charles realizing he had to take parliament down a peg so they realised he was of higher authority, be it through dissolving parliament again or through the previous attempt on the 5 members at a grander scale. Parliament wanted to ensure their position was secure and began to raise an unofficial army through the use of a militia ordinance which they had no prerogative to control and so Charles could do nothing but retaliate through raising an army of his own which would protect the traditions of the kingdom. Parliament was abusing their power for decades and was able to get away with it until they took too many powers away from the king and it was realised that they were trying to achieve removing all powers from Charles until they had all or the majority of the power from the king for themselves. The painting shows how determined parliament were to keep their power in that period and many of the MP's from that parliament returned to the long parliament which would cause trouble for Charles until he needed to take control back and thus is evidence that parliament are more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war.

[10] The trial of Strafford by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth shows the impeachment of Strafford by the House of Commons and gives evidence that Pym and the other members of the commons were trying to reduce Charles to nothing but a figurehead through impeachments of Charles' top ministers such as Laud or Strafford, these were attempts to remove all power to dissolve parliament from Charles as they knew Strafford was one of Charles' top advisors and without him the king would have to relook at his policies and would also have to listen to the House of Commons more as they would be his only means of choosing new policies, the commons knew they could use this to their advantage and so removed Strafford which enabled them to remove further powers from the king such as Forest fines or monopolies. This in turn led to Charles realising that he needed to reassert his power when he gathered more allies from people realizing parliament were going too far with their removal of the kings powers, this led to a power struggle between the two parties which ultimately led to parliament drafting up the militia ordinance and in doing so causing the outbreak of the civil war.

In conclusion to the question *"Was Charles more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war?"* Charles was not the most responsible it was parliament that was the main cause of the outbreak of the civil war. Parliaments constant front of attack on the kings prerogatives are what led to the Civil War, this is because ultimately Charles had to defend his prerogatives as a monarch and could not let parliament strengthen to the extent where a monarchy was no longer needed in the Kingdom such as some radicals wanted, parliament felt that they could strengthen themselves to the extent where they had the power to undermine the king. All it took was the king to retaliate against parliaments advances and the civil war would kick off. Parliament believed that Charles I was weak compared to James I and past monarchs, they believed that if they took advantage of the king then they could consolidate their power and strengthen their position until they had more power than the king and could run the country with Charles as nothing more than a figurehead to push through the parliaments policies. Charles was not more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war because he was taken advantage of by parliament until he could take no more from them and so he went and attempted to arrest the 5 members, this aggravated parliament and they issued the militia ordinance thus starting and causing the outbreak of the civil war.

Word count with Sources – 4055

Word count without Sources – 3700

Footnotes:

- [1] Source pack, document 1, Lawrence stone, an academic historian and specialist in early modern British history, writing in a specialist text-book, the causes of the English Revolution (1972).
- [2] The Causes of the English Civil War (British History in Perspective), Ann Hughes (1998). Pg. 150
- [3] The History of the Rebellion: A new selection, Edward Hyde Earl of Clarendon (2009). Pg. 8
- [4] Source Pack, document 6, Attempted Arrest of 5 members of the House of Commons by Charles I, 1642' by Charles Cope, commissioned by the Houses of Parliament (1856-66).
- [5] Source Pack, document 4, David Smith a constitutional historian and specialist in 16th – 17th century writing in "A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707", (1998)
- [6] Source Pack, document 2, From King Charles I's speech on the scaffold, (30th January 1649)
- [7] Conrad Russell, The causes of the English Civil War, Pg.185 (1990)
- [8] Source 1.1, Pg.12, England 1625-1660, Charles I, the Civil War and Cromwell. Dale Scarboro (2005)
- [9] Painting showing House of Commons 1628-29 Speaker Finch held by Holles and Valentine by Andrew Carrick Gow (1912)



- [10] The Trial of Strafford, Painting by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth (c.1844)



Bibliography:

Independently researched sources.

Source 2 - Ann Hughes writing in *The Causes of the English Civil War* (British History in Perspective.) Published by Macmillan in 1998, Page 150.

Source 3 – Edward Hyde of Clarendon writing in *The History of the Rebellion: A new selection*, Edited by Paul Seaward. Published by Oxford University Press in 2009, Page 8.

Source 7 – Conrad Russell writing in *The Causes of the English Civil War*. Published by Clarendon Press in 1990, page 185

Source 8 – Dale Scarboro writing in *England 1625-1660, Charles I, the Civil War and Cromwell*. Published by Hodder Education in 2005, Page 12.

Source 9 – (Visual Source) Speaker Finch held by Holles and Valentine by Andrew Carrick Gow painted in 1912 (<http://www.parliament.uk/worksofart/artwork/andrew-carrick-gow/no-title--house-of-commons-1628-9-speaker-finch-held-by-holles-and-valentine-/2950>)

Source 10 – (Visual Source) *The Trial of Strafford* by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth c.1884 (<http://www.parliament.uk/about/art-in-parliament/in-the-picture/the-story-behind-the-trial-of-strafford1/>)

Centre provided Sources

Source 1 - Extract from *The causes of the English Revolution* by Lawrence Stone (Provided in source pack by school.)

Source 4 – (Visual Source) *Attempted Arrest of 5 members of the House of Commons by Charles I, 1642'* by Charles Cope (Provided in source pack by school.)

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Source 6 – King Charles I's speech on the scaffold. (Provided in Source pack by school.)

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Whigs, Tories and Revisionists; these are the three schools of thought I will be reviewing and then will analyse each of the schools view on which of the two parties during the 1600s were more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war, Charles I or Parliament. I will then give my conclusion to sum up all the evidence I have supplied to support my answer to the underlying question. Charles I may have started the civil war through his attempt on the five members but Charles' hand was forced by parliament as individuals in parliament were continually attacking the crown's prerogative to strengthen their own position throughout the kingdom, this meant Charles I was forced to start the civil war by addressing the situation on hand by the only means he knew and saw fit.



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and their position against the king. In Charles saving Buckingham this was seen as proof that Buckingham was guilty for his actions, Charles was doing this out of loyalty as he believed *"there is a protection very gracious and just which princes owe to their servants"*, Edward Hyde also believed in this and so agreed that he should have attempted to save Buckingham, this view angered parliament as they felt it was a way for Charles to unjustifiably obstruct justice and he was seen to shelter the accused from answering their actions. Edward believed Charles would have been in a better position of power if *"parliaments had been taught to know their own bounds by being allowed to proceed as far as they could go"*. Charles should have allowed the House of Commons to only do what they were allowed to do then he should have stopped them but Charles allowing them to continue he lost his power that he had over the house and so that made parliament believe they could take further power from the king for their own, parliament's growth and their belief that Charles was abusing his prerogative right to dissolve parliament when he so wished in order to save his friends from persecution was responsible for creating tension between the two parties and ultimately led to parliament abusing their privileges to solidify their position and attacking the king until he was then forced to retaliate and cause the outbreak of the Civil War.

[4] Parliament believed in their privileges and felt they should assert them to the point of defying the king. In 1656 parliament commissioned a painting of the attempted arrest of the 5 members, this painting shows the speaker Lenthall asserting his and the parliament's privileges against Charles, it also shows many of the MP's amazed at the king entering the house of commons as no royal is allowed to. Being commissioned by parliament, it shows how they believed it was a breach of their most sacred privileges and Charles had no right whatsoever to try and attempt to arrest the 5 members of parliament as whatever they may have said in parliament could not be held against them. Parliamentary privileges were a staple of tension during this era because Charles felt it unfair parliament was trying to make away with all of his privileges, this view from parliament led to Charles feeling unjustly attacked, he believed he should do something about this to protect his position at the heart of the monarchy and the kingdom. This led to the attempt of the 5 members and the outbreak of the civil war. the commissioned painting makes the assessment that Charles was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war, knowing past events and sources of tension the painting offers up a different view that parliament were beginning to think of Charles and the monarchy as a lesser power to them and that they could do whatever they wished and no matter the consequences it did not affect them, this gives the assessment that parliament was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. Parliament had no right to attack Charles' prerogatives as he also had no right to attack the parliament's privileges but with parliament constantly attacking the King's powers he had little else to do as he was the governor of the land no them and so he needed to show authority to show parliament he was not to be trifled with.

[5] David Smith does not believe that the short term causes or the long term causes between the two parties are what led to the outbreak of the war he believed it was the conflicting relationships between the two and *"long term structural problems help to explain why a crisis of some kind befell the early Stuart monarchies"*. he felt that these long term causes originated from the *"fact that each Kingdom was part of a composite monarchy"* the Stuart monarchies were in control of the whole of Britain and so had to deal with individual issues throughout England, Scotland and Ireland, the conflicts that broke out throughout these kingdoms were down to underlying conflicts each kingdom shared with one another, Scotland had a strict puritan church known as the kirk where Ireland was original Catholic and so complete uniformity as Charles wanted was difficult to achieve as the kingdoms had different ideologies, Smith argued these conflicts could *"be traced back over several decades"* Smith also argues that it is a *"highly significant point that the crisis did not come under James I but under Charles I"*. This indicates David Smith still thinks Charles plays some minor role in the outbreak of the civil war and was more responsible than parliament in the outbreak.

The crisis came under the rule of Charles I and not James I because parliament had grown stronger than ever before and realised that Charles was not as strong a ruler than James I, this let parliament take advantage of Charles, they would not give Charles the subsidies and money other monarchs were given in an attempt to make their position as they would then be invaluable to the king as seen during Charles personal rule he had to convene parliament when he needed finance for the Bishops war against the Scottish. This way of solidifying their position makes them more responsible for the civil war because they undermined the king to assert themselves and in turn once the king had realised that parliament had gone too far he tried to reconsolidate his power, parliament took offence and the Civil War began.

[6] Charles pleaded his innocence and even at his speech at the scaffold of his execution he began by first insisting his innocence. Charles believed he was not the one who started the war but it was parliament, he admits encroaching upon parliaments privileges but says he did not intend to do so and parliament attacked his prerogatives first. *"they began upon me; it is the militia they began upon"* he blames parliament for the outbreak of the civil war and that they firstly attacked him and all he did which anyone would do is retaliate to protect his own prerogatives against the unjustified attack from parliament and the few radicals in the house of commons. Charles saw himself as a martyr for the people and the kingdom, he felt that parliament was the first one to commission an army to attack the other party, in the short term they were the ones to blame for the outbreak of the civil war. In the long term Parliament had also been attacking the king's prerogatives and attacking the crown. Charles acknowledges that parliament knew the militia belonged to him but parliament *"thought it was fit for to have it from me"* this is what Charles believes started the civil war *"they began these unhappy troubles, not I"*. Charles' prerogatives gave him the rule of the militia and with parliament attempting to take it from him was an attempt to strengthen their own power and gives the assessment that parliament was more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war.

[7] *"You cannot believe the alteration in the opinion of the world touching his majesty". This comment by the Earl of Kellie to the Earl of Mar, marks the end of the 'honeymoon period' at the beginning of Charles' reign, and it's dated 26 July 1625, when Charles had only been four months on the throne. It marks a remarkably swift general recognition, during Charles' first year, that as a king he was not a success and that judgement is one which has never been reversed"*.

Conrad Russell concluded that Charles showed he was not a king who was going to be successful and that whatever Charles concluded in his policies or any decision, his mind would not be changed on the subject, this is evident in most of Charles' early policies as many of his policies at this stage were determined by the king and his ministers and if the commons had any problem with the policies Charles would simply dismiss their allegations, this was likely to create animosity between the two parties. This shows that Russell was implying that Charles was to blame for the outbreak of the civil war and for the tension between the two leading up to the outbreak of the civil war.

In my opinion this source also gives the impression that the parliament was more responsible for the civil war outbreak as in the source it shows that it was evident that in the kings early years he was detested by both parliament and his ministers. This distaste festered in the House of Commons and later evolved from dislike into hatred of the total monarchy. With parliament already disliking Charles they ensured his reign as monarch was hard from the beginning such as when Charles ascended to the throne in 1625 he asked the commons to grant him tonnage and poundage as the monarchs before him, much to his dismay he was only granted tonnage and poundage on an annual basis, this could be seen as an early attempt by parliament to control the kings finances and his methods of collecting money which in turn affects the policies the king can use, whether this was intentional is no matter as this created a huge rift and universal distrust between the two parties which inevitably boiled down until the outbreak of the civil war, this is reasoning to the argument that parliament was more responsible for the civil war outbreak.

[8] *"Nothing like this had ever happened before. It was the first time the House of Commons challenged the King's right to close parliament".*

This shows the magnitude of the commons' ego at this time of Charles' reign, they attempted to defy the king's orders and attack his prerogative by doing so. The members of the house began to believe they were vital in the running of the country and without them the country would erupt into sheer chaos, this convoluted view of themselves caused many MP's to become power hungry and try to take power from the monarchy and give it to themselves. The reasoning to the dissolution of parliament was that they were not giving the king what was needed and were just creating tension by disrespecting the king's policies. This justified the king's reasons to dissolve the commons and interference by the parliament was also justification, this constant interference by the commons led to Charles distrusting parliament and so he decided that his only option was to close the houses and resort to personal rule, parliament being a thorn in Charles' side is evidence they were to blame for the tension leading to the outbreak of the civil war and tells you of the amount of members of the commons who did not respect the kings authority. The parliament was attempting to remove power from Charles and so he did what he had to which was to retaliate, this happened years later when Charles had to protect his right as king to be the head of the army and thus started the outbreak of the civil war.

[9] The painting by Andrew Carrick Gow shows the ferocity the house of commons were willing to go to ensure that parliament would not be closed in 1629, this gives proof that parliament were willing to do what they believed was necessary to ensure that their positions of power were safe and so gives evidence that when Charles did not accept the nineteen propositions which included the commons taking full control of the army from Charles and therefore leading to Charles realizing he had to take parliament down a peg so they realised he was of higher authority, be it through dissolving parliament again or through the previous attempt on the 5 members at a grander scale. Parliament wanted to ensure their position was secure and began to raise an unofficial army through the use of a militia ordinance which they had no prerogative to control and so Charles could do nothing but retaliate through raising an army of his own which would protect the traditions of the kingdom. Parliament was abusing their power for decades and was able to get away with it until they took too many powers away from the king and it was realised that they were trying to achieve removing all powers from Charles until they had all or the majority of the power from the king for themselves. The painting shows how determined parliament were to keep their power in that period and many of the MP's from that parliament returned to the long parliament which would cause trouble for Charles until he needed to take control back and thus is evidence that parliament are more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war.

[10] The trial of Strafford by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth shows the impeachment of Strafford by the House of Commons and gives evidence that Pym and the other members of the commons were trying to reduce Charles to nothing but a figurehead through impeachments of Charles' top ministers such as Laud or Strafford, these were attempts to remove all power to dissolve parliament from Charles as they knew Strafford was one of Charles' top advisors and without him the king would have to relook at his policies and would also have to listen to the House of Commons more as they would be his only means of choosing new policies, the commons knew they could use this to their advantage and so removed Strafford which enabled them to remove further powers from the king such as Forest fines or monopolies. This in turn led to Charles realising that he needed to reassert his power when he gathered more allies from people realizing parliament were going too far with their removal of the kings powers, this led to a power struggle between the two parties which ultimately led to parliament drafting up the militia ordinance and in doing so causing the outbreak of the civil war.

In conclusion to the question *"Was Charles more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war?"* Charles was not the most responsible it was parliament that was the main cause of the outbreak of the civil war. Parliaments constant front of attack on the kings prerogatives are what led to the Civil War, this is because ultimately Charles had to defend his prerogatives as a monarch and could not let parliament strengthen to the extent where a monarchy was no longer needed in the Kingdom such as some radicals wanted, parliament felt that they could strengthen themselves to the extent where they had the power to undermine the king. All it took was the king to retaliate against parliaments advances and the civil war would kick off. Parliament believed that Charles I was weak compared to James I and past monarchs, they believed that if they took advantage of the king then they could consolidate their power and strengthen their position until they had more power than the king and could run the country with Charles as nothing more than a figurehead to push through the parliaments policies. Charles was not more responsible for the outbreak of the civil war because he was taken advantage of by parliament until he could take no more from them and so he went and attempted to arrest the 5 members, this aggravated parliament and they issued the militia ordinance thus starting and causing the outbreak of the civil war.



Marks awarded by moderator:



Suggestions to improve provided by moderator:





Footnotes:

[1] Source pack, document 1, Lawrence stone, an academic historian and specialist in early modern British history, writing in a specialist text-book, the causes of the English Revolution (1972).

[2] The Causes of the English Civil War (British History in Perspective), Ann Hughes (1998). Pg. 150

[3] The History of the Rebellion: A new selection, Edward Hyde Earl of Clarendon (2009). Pg. 8

[4] Source Pack, document 6, Attempted Arrest of 5 members of the House of Commons by Charles I, 1642' by Charles Cope, commissioned by the Houses of Parliament (1856-66).



[5] Source Pack, document 4, David Smith a constitutional historian and specialist in 16th – 17th century writing in "A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707", (1998)

[6] Source Pack, document 2, From King Charles I's speech on the scaffold, (30th January 1649)

[7] Conrad Russell, The causes of the English Civil War, Pg.185 (1990)

[8] Source 1.1, Pg.12, England 1625-1660, Charles I, the Civil War and Cromwell. Dale Scarboro (2005)

[9] Painting showing House of Commons 1628-29 Speaker Finch held by Holles and Valentine by Andrew Carrick Gow (1912)



[10] The Trial of Strafford, Painting by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth (c.1844)



Bibliography:

Independently researched sources.

Source 2 - Ann Hughes writing in The Causes of the English Civil War (British History in Perspective.) Published by Macmillan in 1998, Page 150.

Source 3 – Edward Hyde of Clarendon writing in The History of the Rebellion: A new selection, Edited by Paul Seaward. Published by Oxford University Press in 2009, Page 8.

Source 7 – Conrad Russell writing in The Causes of the English Civil War. Published by Clarendon Press in 1990, page 185

Source 8 – Dale Scarboro writing in England 1625-1660, Charles I, the Civil War and Cromwell. Published by Hodder Education in 2005, Page 12.

Source 9 – (Visual Source) Speaker Finch held by Holles and Valentine by Andrew Carrick Gow painted in 1912 (<http://www.parliament.uk/worksofart/artwork/andrew-carrick-gow/no-title--house-of-commons-1628-9-speaker-finch-held-by-holles-and-valentine-/2950>)

Source 10 – (Visual Source) The Trial of Strafford by Thomas Alfred Woolnoth c.1884 (<http://www.parliament.uk/about/art-in-parliament/in-the-picture/the-story-behind-the-trial-of-strafford1/>)

Centre provided Sources

Source 1 - Extract from The causes of the English Revolution by Lawrence Stone (Provided in source pack by school.)

Source 4 – (Visual Source) Attempted Arrest of 5 members of the House of Commons by Charles I, 1642' by Charles Cope (Provided in source pack by school.)



Source 5 – Extract from A History of the Modern British Isles, 1603-1707 by David Smith (Provided in Source pack by school.)

Source 6 – King Charles I's speech on the scaffold. (Provided in Source pack by school.)

‘Chamberlain followed the only realistic policy for Britain in the Munich crisis of 1938.’ How valid is this assessment of Chamberlain’s policy during the Czech crisis?

In 1938, former Prime Minister Chamberlain faced one of the greatest challenges of his career; reacting to the Munich Crisis. The policy of Appeasement was chosen by Chamberlain to tackle the situation in Czechoslovakia, but his decision is still argued to the present day; was it the most realistic for Britain? The act of appeasement is used for the policy of accepting the demands of an aggressor. It was at this time, Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement is seen as a failure in the eyes of many Historians to this present time; but others still argue that appeasement was the most realistic policy at the time. Historian’s opinions are influenced by their school of thought. For example, historian’s opinions on appeasement may be different depending on where they are from; an historian from the time – or not long after – when Chamberlain appeased Hitler, may think the policy was an utter failure, whereas an historian post WWII may look back to Chamberlain’s decision and believe that it was the most reasonable policy to follow. These different viewpoints can be divided into different schools of thought. In this essay I will be focusing on three schools of thought; Orthodox, Revisionists and Counter-Revisionists.

The Orthodox view of appeasement can be seen as the 'anti-appeasement' opinion. This means that British politicians and the government itself would have been seen as weak as they believe Britain was “meant” to stand up to Fascism and Hitler. There was a large amount of popularity for this point of view because a lot of the public believed that there were numerous other policies that could have been created. However, shown later on, there was not as much freedom for the British policy-makers as the public thought; it was revealed that Britain could not control European diplomacy by itself for a wide-range of reasons. This is partly due to Britain having unreliable allies and too many countries in the EU or bordering the EU being controlled by an extremist party. USA was in a state of isolationism and did not want to take part in European affairs, although the USA took part in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. France was dealing with government issues and faced a fascist uprising. Similarly, Spain was dealing with a civil war against a fascist uprising. Germany and Italy were both under fascist control and Russia was under communist control; the rest of Europe didn’t have the military or political power to enforce European laws. This left Britain by itself to deal with Europe’s ordeals.

Revisionism is a type of historiography where an Historian looks back on appeasement and looks into all the factors around an event. Revisionism emerged in the 1950s as a new group of post-war historians. Orthodox historians tended to see appeasement as unworkable and historians such as AJP Taylor argue that appeasement was not as bad as orthodox historians make it out to be. With more and more information gathered about Nazi Germany and Hitler's motives; historians believe that he did not necessarily have plans to have a war. Many Revisionists argue that appeasement was the only realistic policy because Hitler was unpredictable and that appeasement was diplomatically suitable at the time. Furthermore, some historians believe that appeasement was successful in a way because Britain and France were not ready to fight against Germany; it bought time for them both.

In the early 1990s the 'counter-revisionist' ideology was developed. The counter-revisionist view point on appeasement takes a more rational and balanced view and they come to the conclusion that appeasement was the only viable option for Britain, but it was implemented

poorly. Counter-revisionists believe that the policy of appeasement was brought in too late and was not enforced correctly in order to control Hitler's demands. Appeasement is seen as a good policy because the British Empire was so weak after World War I. McDonough is a key counter-revisionist that explains appeasement to be 'crisis management strategy' that was designed to make Hitler solve things peacefully.

A noteworthy Historian from the Revisionist school of thought is A J P Taylor. Born March 1906, AJP Taylor grew up to be a famous historian who specialised in 19th-20th century European diplomacy. Taylor was a left-wing pacifist and was a member of the British Communist Party, until 1926 when he left. Both of Taylor's wealthy parents supported left-wing views, meaning that Taylor was born into a family with left-wing views and grew up to being influenced by them. After leaving the Communist Party, Taylor became a supporter of the Labour Party for the rest of his life. Until 1936, Taylor opposed British Rearmament as he thought that a re-armed Britain would ally itself with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. As Taylor was a left-wing supporter and for a long time supported the views of Communism, it was his belief that the Soviet Union was a more suitable ally than Nazi Germany. AJP Taylor's believed appeasement to be a good thing for Britain as it prolonged peace; which is what Taylor obviously preferred due to his pacifist views.

Taylor states in his book 'The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy ... not a triumph for Hitler'. From Taylor's life we can see why Taylor considers the Munich Conference as a British triumph. Due to Chamberlain appeasing Hitler, Britain did not face war against Germany but instead Chamberlain prolonged it. From the Munich Conference Hitler had to slow his advances into the east which gave time for Britain to rearm and to be ready for a possible war with Germany. Taylor would have supported the news from Munich as the result of the conference provided Britain's people with peace. Also Chamberlain's agreement with Hitler was a good thing to happen for Britain because public opinion was anti-war for a long period of time, meaning that Britain's army would have no morale, which from hindsight could have been enough for Britain to have lost the war.

William Shirer was an American journalist, war correspondent and historian, wrote a variety of books, which are related to Nazi Germany and World War II; Shirer was hired by the Berlin bureau of the Universal News Service and later moved from this job and found work at CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System). Shirer was able to move with German troops when War broke out and reported on many different military operations; including the invasion of France. Shirer has firsthand experience of Nazi war tactics and was able to report on the signing of the German armistice with France. However censorship became a huge problem and many reports of the armistice were completely obliterated by the Nazis; Shirer was lucky enough to avoid this by going to Compiègne with a German officer which despised Hitler. The report on the armistice by Shirer was hailed as a masterpiece as it completely avoided censorship and gave true details and not bias and manipulated details.

The final settlement forced Czechoslovakia to give Germany 11,000 square miles of territory. Within this area lay all the vast Czech fortifications. Czechoslovakia's entire system of rail, road, telephone and telegraph communications was disrupted. It lost 66% of its coal, 86% of its chemicals, 80% of its textiles, 70% of its electrical power, and 40% of its timber. A prosperous industrial nation was split up and bankrupted overnight.

The statement is from Shirer writing after the war in 1959. The statistics show worrying details on what Czechoslovakia lost from the Munich conference; which reflects a negative

view on appeasement. This also reveals how selfish appeasement was; 'A prosperous industrial nation was split up and bankrupted overnight.' This line from Shirer reflects how a whole nation was destroyed because Britain was too afraid of war and Britain only took military action when it was starting to affect Britain directly. Shirer gives a negative interpretation of appeasement and it's understandable, according to his past. Shirer was there in person to witness Nazi Germany's he was able to witness war tactics: Blitzkrieg. He was also forced to flee to Compiègne in order for him to report on the Treaty of Paris, without it being censored. Shirer experienced the horrors of the Nazi's war crimes, tactics and even their beliefs. In order for Shirer to report on the Treaty of Paris, without his work being mutilated by Nazi censorship he had to flee the country. This shows that he opposed the Nazi regime as he risked a lot to send out an uncensored report, in hope that it would be in some benefit to other countries in the world.

Robert Alexander Clarke Parker is a British Historian who is known for his work on appeasement, Nazi Germany and World War II. Parker was born in Barnsley, Yorkshire, 15 June 1927 and later died in Oxford, 23 April 2001. A fellow historian Kenneth O Morgan published in the Guardian, Wednesday 25 April 2001 about Parker's life and work. He later describes Parker as: 'perhaps the leading authority on the international crises of the 1930s, appeasement and the coming of war'. Parker worked a portion of his life as a lecturer in History from 1952 to 1957. Parker was also known to be an admirer of Winston Churchill and held Old Labour views.

The Chamberlainites relied on sympathetic treatment of German grievances to win Hitler to peaceful ways. They did not succeed, for, it seems, their conduct strengthened both Hitler's ambition and internal authority. A linked error loomed large; western association with the USSR would annoy and provoke, rather than restrain, the Nazis and non Nazi Germans. Chamberlain therefore shunned co-operation with the Soviet Union on any terms and tried to prevent it. Another mistake was the assumption that the USSR and Nazi Germany could never combine. This study proposes that the balance of evidence points to counter revisionist interpretations. Led by Chamberlain the government rejected effective deterrence. Chamberlain's powerful, obstinate personality and his skill in debate probably stifled serious chances of preventing the Second World War.

From Parker's 'Chamberlain and appeasement; British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War', we can see how his admiration for Winston Churchill is shown through his work. In Document 7, Parker gives a rather fair judgement on Chamberlain and the need for Appeasement. Originally we get a negative view on Chamberlain; 'The Chamberlainites relied of sympathetic treatment of German grievances to win Hitler to peaceful ways ... They did not succeed ... their conduct strengthened both Hitler's ambition and internal authority'. Many historians would agree to this statement and blame Chamberlain and his followers for strengthening Hitler and abandoning Czech, but Parker later points out why Chamberlain has to resort to his decision. 'The USSR would annoy sand provoke, rather than restrain the Nazis ... Chamberlain therefore shunned co-operation with the Soviet Union', if Britain were to co-operate with the USSR, there was the fear of war still. Germany's interest lied in the East and if the USSR provoked the Nazis, it could have acted as a catalyst and the out-break of war would come earlier in Europe. If this was to happen, Britain was still not ready for war and France's government was still weak. Furthermore history tells us that the USSR was close to defeat, if war came earlier it could have meant the defeat of the USSR, France and Britain. Chamberlain's ultimate goal was to preserve peace and a relationship with the USSR could possibly have threatened Chamberlain's goal, due to Stalin's goal of spreading communism and wanting to reclaim the Old Russian Empire's lands. This links to Parker's line: 'Another mistake was the assumption that the USSR and Nazi Germany could never combine.' As

mentioned previously Stalin wanted to spread communism and wanted to reclaim the Old Russian Empire's lands. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was clear proof that the unexpected could happen. AJP Taylor's idea of Britain working with the USSR probably would have prevented this, but Britain was simply too scared of Communism and seen Nazism as the lesser of the two evils. Furthermore the pact acted as a gateway to Poland for Hitler.


Churchill was a successful politician, being elected as PM twice 26 October 10 May 1940 – 26 July 1945 and 1951 – 7 April 1955; Churchill is considered one of the greatest war-time leaders in history. He also served in the British Army, serving in 1895–1900 and 1902–24 and even participated in the Second Boer War between Britain and the Boer Republics. In December 1894 he graduated and was later commissioned as a Cornet (Second Lieutenant) in the 4th Queen's Own Hussars on 20 February 1895. Churchill's military experience is likely to influence his views on international conflicts, especially the Munich conference and the run up to World War II. From Churchill's past we can see that he probably has a biased view of the British Army and was one hundred percent confident it was ready to face the might of Nazi Germany, but can be argued that he was over-confident with the British Army. He was considered to be over-confident with the British army because the German Army was much more prepared than Britain. Throughout the 1920s on paper it seemed like Germany was abiding by the terms set by the Treaty of Versailles but in reality it was training pilots and submarine crews abroad; training some pilots in civilian aircraft instead of military fighter jets. On paper Hitler had a small and weak army, but the reality was something different. In 1933, Hitler had his general triple the size of Germany's army to 300,000 men. He had the Air Ministry to increase the amount of war planes to 1,000 and also ordered more military buildings such as barracks to be built. Hitler realised that Germany was the centre of Europe and it needed a strong army for it remain a strong power in Europe; at the time of the Czech crisis Germany's army was at the approximate size of 850,000. Britain was left on its own to deal with European affairs, it had no reliable allies to enforce rulings set by the treaties. Britain did not have the military power to be dealing with Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin; the British Army's size was approximately 220,000 soldiers and half of these battalions were based around the world, protecting different parts of the empire. Britain's people also were not prepared for war, it's why Chamberlain was praised by the crowds and the House of Commons for appeasing Hitler, Britain did not want war.

I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore and forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely that we have sustained a total defeat and that France has suffered more than we have. All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be offered to us year by year unless, by a supreme recovery of our moral strength and military vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden times.

Previously mentioned some people view the Munich Conference as betraying Czechoslovakia and the act being a selfish and only benefitting Britain. Churchill was an MP that kept reminding those in Parliament of reality of the Munich Conference and Churchill craved war. 'All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken Czechoslovakia recedes into darkness.' Churchill had a strong attitude about appeasement and often criticised it, he always suggested that Britain and France should form a military alliance with Soviet Russia. Other historians (AJP Taylor) argue the same point and Chamberlain and his government should have cooperated with the USSR for the better good. He also believed that the British Army was capable of standing up to Germany; but the reality is that there would have been a demand for the boys and men to sign up to the army to fight and there was no morale throughout the British public. From hindsight we can see that

Churchill was right, it did not stop Hitler, it may have slowed down his intentions, but Hitler did invade the rest of Czechoslovakia and later turned his interests to Poland. Churchill saw through Hitler's "mask" and arguing that he is only taking back Germany's former lands; he knew what Nazi foreign policy was: 'Lebensraum'. From Churchill's military past it may be more obvious to him as he's seen war before, he's even fought in a few battles personally; Churchill's bias views on the British Army and Empire is obviously pushing him to demand war, which is why he's often described as a warmonger.

Sidney Strube was born in December 1892, Bishopsgate, London. Strube studied at St Martin's School of Art, and then began work as a junior draughtsman with a furnishing company. After working in an advertising agency, Strube later went back studying and attended John Hassall School of Art. During a general election Strube saw a cartoon, which inspired him to be a cartoonist. Hassall urged Strube to submit work to the Conservative and Unionist magazine. After several pieces of work were accepted and published, he had further work published in Bystander and Evening Times. Strube's career came to a pause when the outbreak of the First World War occurred. In 1915 Strube joined the army, becoming a corporal in the Artists' Rifles. For part of his service he was a physical training and a bayonet instructor. By December 1918 Strube went back to England and returned to the Daily Express as staff political cartoonist, the paper was excited to have Strube back and even ran the headline: "STRUBE COMES BACK." During the late thirties the Daily Express was a strong supporter of the appeasement policies formed by Chamberlain's government. This was mainly due to the influence of its owner Lord Beaverbrook; A large influence in Britain's media owning the Daily Express, Sunday Express and the Evening Standard, his political career included serving as a Minister in the British government during both World Wars.



Strube's cartoon appeared in the Daily Express approximately six months after the Munich Conference. Strube suggests that the Czech State's independence is slowly burning out; as suggested by the low burning candle and is going to be engulfed into darkness by the Nazi regime. However some historians state that Britain were the ones to put out Czechoslovakia's flame of independence, but in this cartoon Strube suggests that it was the Nazis that forces the flame out. The arm with the swastika is placing down a German styled helmet over the Czech state; suffocating and extinguishing the flame, falling into Nazi control.

The Public Ledger was a newspaper, new editions available daily in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The newspaper published from March 25, 1836 to January 1942. For a time The Public Ledger was the most popular newspaper in Philadelphia, but later declined in the mid-1930s. The newspaper's motto was "Virtue Liberty and Independence", this meaning that the newspaper believed in independence and believed in being able to stand strong by itself. This possibly meaning that the newspaper supported isolationism and the cartoon supporting the Munich Pact as it meant the USA did not have to get involved in European affairs.



During the time the cartoon was published in The Public Ledger, USA was in the state of isolationism. Hence, the cartoon portraying the Munich Pact as a saviour for Europe and stopped the possibility of war, this would mean that the US would not have to worry about intervening in Europe if war was to breakout. We know that the cartoon is presenting a positive view about the Munich Pact because it's represented as a life ring which has been thrown to a drowning woman (labelled Europe), who is struggling in the chaos of war (the sea). The life ring (Munich Pact) would keep the woman afloat and alive until she is rescued and safe, or the sea calms and she's able to get her out of danger. In reality, the Munich Pact gave Britain time to prepare for war or to preserve peace (keeping afloat), the idea was for the tension between Britain, France and Nazi Germany to defuse, but unfortunately that was not the case.

The Nebelspalter – the title translates to "Fog-smasher" - is a Swiss satirical magazine, it was founded in 1875. In 1933 the Nebelspalter was banned in the German empire because the Nebelspalter denounced the acts of violence and ideology of the Nazis. The Nebelspalter considered itself to be a 'spearhead of intellectual defense' against National Socialism.



Der Friede von München!

Oktober 1938

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Through hindsight at first it can be seen that appease was not a good policy to combat Nazi Germany's aggressive foreign policy. Appeasement just gave Hitler more and more time to strengthen Germany's armies and plan out how to take back the lands that Germany had lost from the Treaty of Versailles. However, there were no real powers that were able to stand-up to Germany on its own; the USA may have been able to, but their status of isolationism meant that there was going to be little support from USA when dealing with European affairs. The French government was in up-roar and the threat of fascist takeover was great, the French were in no real position to be dealing in foreign affairs because there was too much going on in France itself. The other countries in Europe at this time were either under an extremist group control, or had no real military power to help Britain with dealing in the rest of Europe's affairs. Furthermore, Britain was not in a great position to be handing Europe's affairs; as mentioned previously its allies either were in no position to be able to enforce any rulings or did not want to be involved in European affairs. The British Army was small and spread across the world, keeping control of the rest of the Empire. Britain also had no one new to turn to, Britain was afraid of communism and Britain soon realised that Fascism was a threat to. Britain's people did not want war, the people were still recovering from the First World War and the depression, another war was the last thing on people's minds. If the second World War was to have broke out earlier, there would be no public backing and morale would have been low; not only would Britain's army been outnumbered by Germany's but there would also be no morale throughout the army, which most likely would of ended in Britain being defeated way before Hitler turned his attention to the East. Taking these points into consideration, I believe that appeasement was the best policy for Chamberlain to follow.

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Documents

School Document Pack

Appeasement article – Helen Ellis

Appeasement – Dr Julie

‘Chamberlain followed the only realistic policy for Britain in the Munich crisis of 1938.’ How valid is this assessment of Chamberlain’s policy during the Czech crisis?

In 1938, former Prime Minister Chamberlain faced one of the greatest challenges of his career; reacting to the Munich Crisis. The policy of Appeasement was chosen by Chamberlain to tackle the situation in Czechoslovakia, but his decision is still argued to the present day; was it the most realistic for Britain? The act of appeasement is used for the policy of accepting the demands of an aggressor. It was at this time, Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement is seen as a failure in the eyes of many Historians to this present time; but others still argue that appeasement was the most realistic policy at the time. Historian’s opinions are influenced by their school of thought. For example, historian’s opinions on appeasement may be different depending on where they are from; an historian from the time – or not long after – when Chamberlain appeased Hitler, may think the policy was an utter failure, whereas an historian post WWII may look back to Chamberlain’s decision and believe that it was the most reasonable policy to follow. These different viewpoints can be divided into different schools of thought. In this essay I will be focusing on three schools of thought; Orthodox, Revisionists and Counter-Revisionists.

The Orthodox view of appeasement can be seen as the 'anti-appeasement' opinion. This means that British politicians and the government itself would have been seen as weak as they believe Britain was “meant” to stand up to Fascism and Hitler. There was a large amount of popularity for this point of view because a lot of the public believed that there were numerous other policies that could have been created. However, shown later on, there was not as much freedom for the British policy-makers as the public thought; it was revealed that Britain could not control European diplomacy by itself for a wide-range of reasons. This is partly due to Britain having unreliable allies and too many countries in the EU or bordering the EU being controlled by an extremist party. USA was in a state of isolationism and did not want to take part in European affairs, although the USA took part in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. France was dealing with government issues and faced a fascist uprising. Similarly, Spain was dealing with a civil war against a fascist uprising. Germany and Italy were both under fascist control and Russia was under communist control; the rest of Europe didn’t have the military or political power to enforce European laws. This left Britain by itself to deal with Europe’s ordeals.

Revisionism is a type of historiography where an Historian looks back on appeasement and looks into all the factors around an event. Revisionism emerged in the 1950s as a new group of post-war historians. Orthodox historians tended to see appeasement as unworkable and historians such as AJP Taylor argue that appeasement was not as bad as orthodox historians make it out to be. With more and more information gathered about Nazi Germany and Hitler's motives; historians believe that he did not necessarily have plans to have a war. Many Revisionists argue that appeasement was the only realistic policy because Hitler was unpredictable and that appeasement was diplomatically suitable at the time. Furthermore, some historians believe that appeasement was successful in a way because Britain and France were not ready to fight against Germany; it bought time for them both.

In the early 1990s the 'counter-revisionist' ideology was developed. The counter-revisionist view point on appeasement takes a more rational and balanced view and they come to the conclusion that appeasement was the only viable option for Britain, but it was implemented

poorly. Counter-revisionists believe that the policy of appeasement was brought in too late and was not enforced correctly in order to control Hitler's demands. Appeasement is seen as a good policy because the British Empire was so weak after World War I. McDonough is a key counter-revisionist that explains appeasement to be 'crisis management strategy' that was designed to make Hitler solve things peacefully.



A noteworthy Historian from the Revisionist school of thought is A J P Taylor. Born March 1906, AJP Taylor grew up to be a famous historian who specialised in 19th-20th century European diplomacy. Taylor was a left-wing pacifist and was a member of the British Communist Party, until 1926 when he left. Both of Taylor's wealthy parents supported left-wing views, meaning that Taylor was born into a family with left-wing views and grew up to being influenced by them. After leaving the Communist Party, Taylor became a supporter of the Labour Party for the rest of his life. Until 1936, Taylor opposed British Rearmament as he thought that a re-armed Britain would ally itself with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. As Taylor was a left-wing supporter and for a long time supported the views of Communism, it was his belief that the Soviet Union was a more suitable ally than Nazi Germany. AJP Taylor's believed appeasement to be a good thing for Britain as it prolonged peace; which is what Taylor obviously preferred due to his pacifist views.



Taylor states in his book 'The settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy ... not a triumph for Hitler'. From Taylor's life we can see why Taylor considers the Munich Conference as a British triumph. Due to Chamberlain appeasing Hitler, Britain did not face war against Germany but instead Chamberlain prolonged it. From the Munich Conference Hitler had to slow his advances into the east which gave time for Britain to rearm and to be ready for a possible war with Germany. Taylor would have supported the news from Munich as the result of the conference provided Britain's people with peace. Also Chamberlain's agreement with Hitler was a good thing to happen for Britain because public opinion was anti-war for a long period of time, meaning that Britain's army would have no morale, which from hindsight could have been enough for Britain to have lost the war.



William Shirer was an American journalist, war correspondent and historian, wrote a variety of books, which are related to Nazi Germany and World War II; Shirer was hired by the Berlin bureau of the Universal News Service and later moved from this job and found work at CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System). Shirer was able to move with German troops when War broke out and reported on many different military operations; including the invasion of France. Shirer has firsthand experience of Nazi war tactics and was able to report on the signing of the German armistice with France. However censorship became a huge problem and many reports of the armistice were completely obliterated by the Nazis; Shirer was lucky enough to avoid this by going to Compiègne with a German officer which despised Hitler. The report on the armistice by Shirer was hailed as a masterpiece as it completely avoided censorship and gave true details and not bias and manipulated details.

The final settlement forced Czechoslovakia to give Germany 11,000 square miles of territory. Within this area lay all the vast Czech fortifications. Czechoslovakia's entire system of rail, road, telephone and telegraph communications was disrupted. It lost 66% of its coal, 86% of its chemicals, 80% of its textiles, 70% of its electrical power, and 40% of its timber. A prosperous industrial nation was split up and bankrupted overnight.



The statement is from Shirer writing after the war in 1959. The statistics show worrying details on what Czechoslovakia lost from the Munich conference; which reflects a negative

view on appeasement. This also reveals how selfish appeasement was; 'A prosperous industrial nation was split up and bankrupted overnight.' This line from Shirer reflects how a whole nation was destroyed because Britain was too afraid of war and Britain only took military action when it was starting to affect Britain directly. Shirer gives a negative interpretation of appeasement and it's understandable, according to his past. Shirer was there in person to witness Nazi Germany's he was able to witness war tactics: Blitzkrieg. He was also forced to flee to Compiègne in order for him to report on the Treaty of Paris, without it being censored. Shirer experienced the horrors of the Nazi's war crimes, tactics and even their beliefs. In order for Shirer to report on the Treaty of Paris, without his work being mutilated by Nazi censorship he had to flee the country. This shows that he opposed the Nazi regime as he risked a lot to send out an uncensored report, in hope that it would be in some benefit to other countries in the world.



Robert Alexander Clarke Parker is a British Historian who is known for his work on appeasement, Nazi Germany and World War II. Parker was born in Barnsley, Yorkshire, 15 June 1927 and later died in Oxford, 23 April 2001. A fellow historian Kenneth O Morgan published in the Guardian, Wednesday 25 April 2001 about Parker's life and work. He later describes Parker as: 'perhaps the leading authority on the international crises of the 1930s, appeasement and the coming of war'. Parker worked a portion of his life as a lecturer in History from 1952 to 1957. Parker was also known to be an admirer of Winston Churchill and held Old Labour views.

The Chamberlainites relied on sympathetic treatment of German grievances to win Hitler to peaceful ways. They did not succeed, for, it seems, their conduct strengthened both Hitler's ambition and internal authority. A linked error loomed large; western association with the USSR would annoy and provoke, rather than restrain, the Nazis and non Nazi Germans. Chamberlain therefore shunned co-operation with the Soviet Union on any terms and tried to prevent it. Another mistake was the assumption that the USSR and Nazi Germany could never combine. This study proposes that the balance of evidence points to counter revisionist interpretations. Led by Chamberlain the government rejected effective deterrence. Chamberlain's powerful, obstinate personality and his skill in debate probably stifled serious chances of preventing the Second World War.



From Parker's 'Chamberlain and appeasement; British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War', we can see how his admiration for Winston Churchill is shown through his work. In Document 7, Parker gives a rather fair judgement on Chamberlain and the need for Appeasement. Originally we get a negative view on Chamberlain; 'The Chamberlainites relied of sympathetic treatment of German grievances to win Hitler to peaceful ways ... They did not succeed ... their conduct strengthened both Hitler's ambition and internal authority'. Many historians would agree to this statement and blame Chamberlain and his followers for strengthening Hitler and abandoning Czech, but Parker later points out why Chamberlain has to resort to his decision. 'The USSR would annoy sand provoke, rather than restrain the Nazis ... Chamberlain therefore shunned co-operation with the Soviet Union', if Britain were to co-operate with the USSR, there was the fear of war still. Germany's interest lied in the East and if the USSR provoked the Nazis, it could have acted as a catalyst and the out-break of war would come earlier in Europe. If this was to happen, Britain was still not ready for war and France's government was still weak. Furthermore history tells us that the USSR was close to defeat, if war came earlier it could have meant the defeat of the USSR, France and Britain. Chamberlain's ultimate goal was to preserve peace and a relationship with the USSR could possibly have threatened Chamberlain's goal, due to Stalin's goal of spreading communism and wanting to reclaim the Old Russian Empire's lands. This links to Parker's line: 'Another mistake was the assumption that the USSR and Nazi Germany could never combine.' As



mentioned previously Stalin wanted to spread communism and wanted to reclaim the Old Russian Empire's lands. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was clear proof that the unexpected could happen. AJP Taylor's idea of Britain working with the USSR probably would have prevented this, but Britain was simply too scared of Communism and seen Nazism as the lesser of the two evils. Furthermore the pact acted as a gateway to Poland for Hitler.



Churchill was a successful politician, being elected as PM twice 26 October 10 May 1940 – 26 July 1945 and 1951 – 7 April 1955; Churchill is considered one of the greatest war-time leaders in history. He also served in the British Army, serving in 1895–1900 and 1902–24 and even participated in the Second Boer War between Britain and the Boer Republics. In December 1894 he graduated and was later commissioned as a Cornet (Second Lieutenant) in the 4th Queen's Own Hussars on 20 February 1895. Churchill's military experience is likely to influence his views on international conflicts, especially the Munich conference and the run up to World War II. From Churchill's past we can see that he probably has a biased view of the British Army and was one hundred percent confident it was ready to face the might of Nazi Germany, but can be argued that he was over-confident with the British Army. He was considered to be over-confident with the British army because the German Army was much more prepared than Britain. Throughout the 1920s on paper it seemed like Germany was abiding by the terms set by the Treaty of Versailles but in reality it was training pilots and submarine crews abroad; training some pilots in civilian aircraft instead of military fighter jets. On paper Hitler had a small and weak army, but the reality was something different. In 1933, Hitler had his general triple the size of Germany's army to 300,000 men. He had the Air Ministry to increase the amount of war planes to 1,000 and also ordered more military buildings such as barracks to be built. Hitler realised that Germany was the centre of Europe and it needed a strong army for it remain a strong power in Europe; at the time of the Czech crisis Germany's army was at the approximate size of 850,000. Britain was left on its own to deal with European affairs, it had no reliable allies to enforce rulings set by the treaties. Britain did not have the military power to be dealing with Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin; the British Army's size was approximately 220,000 soldiers and half of these battalions were based around the world, protecting different parts of the empire. Britain's people also were not prepared for war, it's why Chamberlain was praised by the crowds and the House of Commons for appeasing Hitler, Britain did not want war.




I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore and forget but which must nevertheless be stated, namely that we have sustained a total defeat and that France has suffered more than we have. All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be offered to us year by year unless, by a supreme recovery of our moral strength and military vigour, we arise again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden times.

Previously mentioned some people view the Munich Conference as betraying Czechoslovakia and the act being a selfish and only benefitting Britain. Churchill was an MP that kept reminding those in Parliament of reality of the Munich Conference and Churchill craved war. 'All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken Czechoslovakia recedes into darkness.' Churchill had a strong attitude about appeasement and often criticised it, he always suggested that Britain and France should form a military alliance with Soviet Russia. Other historians (AJP Taylor) argue the same point and Chamberlain and his government should have cooperated with the USSR for the better good. He also believed that the British Army was capable of standing up to Germany; but the reality is that there would have been a demand for the boys and men to sign up to the army to fight and there was no morale throughout the British public. From hindsight we can see that

Churchill was right, it did not stop Hitler, it may have slowed down his intentions, but Hitler did invade the rest of Czechoslovakia and later turned his interests to Poland. Churchill saw through Hitler's "mask" and arguing that he is only taking back Germany's former lands; he knew what Nazi foreign policy was: 'Lebensraum'. From Churchill's military past it may be more obvious to him as he's seen war before, he's even fought in a few battles personally; Churchill's bias views on the British Army and Empire is obviously pushing him to demand war, which is why he's often described as a warmonger.



Sidney Strube was born in December 1892, Bishopsgate, London. Strube studied at St Martin's School of Art, and then began work as a junior draughtsman with a furnishing company. After working in an advertising agency, Strube later went back studying and attended John Hassall School of Art. During a general election Strube saw a cartoon, which inspired him to be a cartoonist. Hassall urged Strube to submit work to the Conservative and Unionist magazine. After several pieces of work were accepted and published, he had further work published in Bystander and Evening Times. Strube's career came to a pause when the outbreak of the First World War occurred. In 1915 Strube joined the army, becoming a corporal in the Artists' Rifles. For part of his service he was a physical training and a bayonet instructor. By December 1918 Strube went back to England and returned to the Daily Express as staff political cartoonist, the paper was excited to have Strube back and even ran the headline: "STRUBE COMES BACK." During the late thirties the Daily Express was a strong supporter of the appeasement policies formed by Chamberlain's government. This was mainly due to the influence of its owner Lord Beaverbrook; A large influence in Britain's media owning the Daily Express, Sunday Express and the Evening Standard, his political career included serving as a Minister in the British government during both World Wars.



Strube's cartoon appeared in the Daily Express approximately six months after the Munich Conference. Strube suggests that the Czech State's independence is slowly burning out; as suggested by the low burning candle and is going to be engulfed into darkness by the Nazi regime. However some historians state that Britain were the ones to put out Czechoslovakia's flame of independence, but in this cartoon Strube suggests that it was the Nazis that forces the flame out. The arm with the swastika is placing down a German styled helmet over the Czech state; suffocating and extinguishing the flame, falling into Nazi control.

The Public Ledger was a newspaper, new editions available daily in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The newspaper published from March 25, 1836 to January 1942. For a time The Public Ledger was the most popular newspaper in Philadelphia, but later declined in the mid-1930s. The newspaper's motto was "Virtue Liberty and Independence", this meaning that the newspaper believed in independence and believed in being able to stand strong by itself. This possibly meaning that the newspaper supported isolationism and the cartoon supporting the Munich Pact as it meant the USA did not have to get involved in European affairs.



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Marks awarded by the moderator:



Suggestions for improvement by the moderator:

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Appeasement article – Helen Ellis

Appeasement – Dr Julie

'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant'

How valid is this assessment that the Holocaust was a long term plan?



Word Count –3785 ✓

The 'Holocaust' is the term referring to the mass killing of 6 million Jews during WW2 under the Nazi regime. The primary targets for this act of genocide were Jews living in Europe. When investigating the root cause of the Holocaust, Historians have become divided as to whether Hitler had a plan: which was clear and constant from before he came to power, or whether this argument is too limited. There were clearly others who assumed positions of power within the Nazi Regime and would have participated in carrying out the holocaust- but how far should they bear responsibility for it? In order to separate this historiographical debate, the British marxist historian Timothy Mason coined the terms 'Intentionalist' and 'structuralist' respectively in order to represent the two views in an essay he wrote in 1981.

The interpretation in the question represents the 'Intentionalist' viewpoint, which claims Hitler's plan to eradicate the Jews was both clear and constant, and, importantly that he had a plan with regard to the 'Jewish problem' long before he came to power in September 1933. In the 1970s, advocates of this school of thought were represented by the 'straight road to Auschwitz' argument because they insisted Hitler was fulfilling a programme. Historians such as Daniel Goldhagen who wrote 'Hitler's willing executioners' and Lucy Dawidowicz supported this idea through adopting the numerous anti-Semitic statements made by Hitler in his autobiography 'Mein Kampf' as evidence. From these historians, concepts conveying that Hitler was an extreme Anti-Semite –often exhibited by his Anti-Semitic and discriminative legislation as Chancellor- are common.

The alternative argument would be the structuralist perspective. Following the war, intentionalism had been the first school of thought developed and was accepted by many historians. However, among the historians to challenge this, were Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen. Their main aim was to broaden the moral responsibility for the Holocaust; they refuse to accept that Hitler's hatred for the Jews was sufficient explanation for the holocaust and that the physical extermination of the Jews was not the central political objective of Hitler's dictatorship.

Most structuralists believe the Third Reich operated in a state of 'authoritarian anarchy', and therefore the Nazi persecution of the Jews that emerged was largely unsystematic and done in an improvised fashion. Some of the structuralists use Mein Kampf as a source to support their views, saying that Hitler might have expressed a hatred of the Jews but he did not clearly state he had a particular plan regarding their extermination. Other sources largely used consist of documentation about the henchmen who carried out the Holocaust, and general accounts of the Nazi party's policy towards the Jews as it developed during the Third Reich. Their main source of evidence was foreign policy documents.

RD 1

If we would transform our ideal picture of the People's State into a reality we shall have to keep independent of the forces that now control public life and seek for new forces that will be ready and capable of taking up the fight for such an ideal. For a fight it will have to be, since the first objective will not be to build up the idea of the People's State but rather to wipe out the Jewish State which is now in existence.

Hitler's autobiography "Mein Kampf" (1925)

RD1 is primary evidence. It creates a divide between the Aryan race and the Jewish people and allows them to be seen as outsiders justifying their later exclusion. Further to this, Hitler makes them appear to be the enemy "we will have to keep independent of the forces... and seek for new forces that will be ready and capable of taking up the fight". In stating this, Hitler is suggesting that force will need to be taken to remove the Jewish threat. This is supportive of the interpretation that Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and planned as he suggests that the Jews must be removed and the source was written in 1925.

Written before he came to power; whilst in prison, reinforces the fact that it was his own personal beliefs as there would have been no outside influences such as a wireless to influence his view. Furthermore, Mein Kampf is a widely read autobiography and is unlikely to have been altered which could have reduced the reliability of the source if this had happened. It does not, however, mention the mass systematic killings or gas chambers established to carry out the Holocaust and these are possible grounds for it not being so useful indeed it just says the Jews will be removed, but not how. It is biased and only gives a one-sided point of view: black political literature with extreme racial views but it is useful as it is Hitler's view and it supports the question.

Hitler could not have known that he was going to be in a position wherein he had any power in 1925 which also limits the idea that he had a clear plan to eliminate the Jews. The source is useful as it introduces the ideas of Anti-Semitism, proposes that steps need to be taken to "wipe out the Jewish state" and outlines his general wishes in terms of the Jews. However, under the circumstances we could also be looking at Hitler's ideal for a time when he is not in charge. Hence he is able to write what he feels in an unrestricted way in Mein Kampf. Therefore, the ideas of others; namely his henchmen were the main force behind Anti-Semitic legislation.

On the other hand, this point can be argued. This source is primary evidence and it is reliable as it is Hitler's viewpoint. He feels this way and so we can ascertain that he wanted to take action against the Jews and that he was an Anti-Semite. It can also be re-in forced through Hitler's actions as chancellor because when he was in power Hitler followed this protocol. Ideas expressed were mirrored in his actions such as his extensive persecution of the Jewish people. And, even if the henchmen radicalised steps taken against the Jews, we know that Hitler must have agreed to them.

Born in Austria, Hitler's upbringing would have helped him form his interpretation. At this time the wealthiest family in the village were Jewish and this might have encouraged a feeling of jealousy between him and the Jewish people. In 1908, Hitler travelled to Vienna and during this period would have spent his time –as a failed artist- living in a hostel. He would have seen wealthy Jews walking in the streets. This might have been the catalyst which fuelled his hatred towards them and desires to expose them. In 1918, the Jews were blamed for the failure of WW1; surrounding allegations such as communism. Due to this, there would have been a mutual negative feeling towards the Jewish people at this time. This would have made it easier for Hitler to form such Anti-Semitic feelings as it might have been considered acceptable. In other words, Anti-Semitism was a prevalent feeling in Germany, as it was in Europe. Hitler would not have been alone in his interpretation.

RD 2

Anti-Semitism was the core of Hitler's system of beliefs and the central motivation for his policies. He believed himself to be the savior who would bring redemption to the German people through the annihilation of the Jews, that people who embodied, in his eyes, the Satanic hosts.

Lucy Dawidowicz "The War against the Jews" (1975)

We could interpret this view in relation to the set question as suggesting that Hitler had an 'eliminationist desire' because he aimed to "bring redemption... through the annihilation of the Jews". Further to this, we can assume Dawidowicz believes this desire was 'clear' as, in this source she calls it the "central motivation for his [Hitler's] policies". Or, in other words, that the reason for his various legislative and foreign policy or the way in which he undertook his role as Fuhrer, was to fulfill this goal of killing the Jews "in his eyes, the satanic hosts". This would go a way to also prove his desires 'constant', hence this source is also clearly useful to support the intentionalist viewpoint.

A reason why the source may be considered less useful could be that in the paragraph leading up to the source, Dawidowicz claims "Without that assertive and enduring tradition of anti-Semitism by which the Germans sought self-definition" Hitler would not have been able to "grow his organization and spread its propaganda". By suggesting there were other factors involved i.e. the 'tradition of anti-Semitism' already in Germany, she could be weakening her own argument; saying that the regular Germans allowed the Holocaust to happen. You could also assume that this means that the eliminationist desire she hopes to prove, was not as clear or in fact as constant if Hitler needed the anti-Semitic beliefs of the people to push his policies forward. Therefore, the source could be considered to be of limited utility.

Dawidowicz was an American Zionist Jew, it is possible that her Jewish origin makes her susceptible to bias regarding her interpretation, especially as Kalmanovich and Reisen, some leading scholars she had become close to during her time working at the Yiddish Scientific Institute from 1938 were killed in the Holocaust. She had been close to Kalmanovich and his family, who she even described as being her real parents. However, as a well-recognised historian we must also say that her interpretation has some weight and this can give the source utility and reliability on the grounds that her evidence has been properly researched. She herself admits she was too passionate.

Factors which might have influenced her interpretation include her time spent in Poland after WW2. In 1946 she provided aid for Holocaust survivors and would have recognised that the population of Eastern European Jewry she had lived among before the war had been destroyed. She also would have seen the devastation the Holocaust had caused first hand. She met survivors and interviewed them. Further to this, Dawidowicz married a Polish Jew in 1948. Having such close relations with people affected by the Holocaust must have had some impact on how she formed her interpretation, she may also have formed her viewpoint as a defence mechanism against the people she had lost and she needed someone to blame for what happened during the war.

However, her close and immediate contact with survivors also means she had access to eye-witness sources which could give her a unique insight into the Holocaust. She witnessed the Nuremberg Trials and had access to transcripts of these trials. This will make her interpretation of events both

useful and reliable as she has her own primary experience to pair with the secondary research undertaken.

All these factors have an effect on value of her interpretation. However, predominantly we must conclude that the interpretation is still valid as first-hand experience is important when trying to evaluate how events occurred during the Holocaust and she is a well-researched historian.

RD 3

In that respect the practice of state very often failed to accord with the idea of the Führer state. The separation of the Führer from the government, his 'absence' and the growing difficulty for Ministers to get access to Hitler (particularly noticeable in the summer months which Hitler largely spent at Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden), frequently resulted in an uncoordinated juxtaposition of the Reich government and the Führer's authority.

Martin Broszat – Hitler state (1981)

This source gives the judgment that Hitler could not be held responsible for the Holocaust as he wasn't present in government at all times. This would suggest that the interpretation in the question is invalid. Broszat claims "his 'absence' and the growing difficulty for ministers to get access to Hitler... resulted in an uncoordinated juxtaposition of the Reich government and the Führer's authority." Therefore, any reference to a 'Führer state' would be wrong as there were others who took control during Hitler's absence e.g. Goebbels. For this reason, this source is useful in saying why Hitler's supposedly 'eliminationist desire' was not 'clear' or 'constant'.

Primary evidence proves that Hitler did spend an increasing amount of time away from Berlin and in his retreat at Obersalzberg. In 1935-6 the building was expanded and renamed the Burghof, where he spent more time than anywhere else during WW2, again suggesting that the Holocaust was not directed by Hitler. This supports the reliability of the source.

Martin Broszat, born in 1926 was a German historian/professor. The fact that he was German and that in 1944 as a university student he joined the SS would mean that he probably had first-hand knowledge with regard to the Holocaust. This could make the source useful as it means he had an insight into being a member of the SS and perhaps enabled him to appreciate –or at least understand- the chaotic nature of government in Nazi Germany from within.

One of Broszat's key ideas is that 'internal rivalry' within the Hitler state and party provided the driving force behind Nazi Germany. We know from other sources -both primary and secondary- that there was a rivalry to please Hitler or otherwise get to the top of Hitler's favour and perhaps this is what Broszat discovered during his time in the SS. Whether or not this is the case, the fact that this can be supported gives us reason to believe this source is reliable and useful.

It is possible that Mommsen had an influence on Broszat's judgment as they worked together for a time. This could make the source less reliable if Mommsen persuaded Broszat to take a more structuralist standpoint. However, as an independent historian Broszat would be able to evaluate the evidence collected by the Bavaria Project and formulate his own opinion about it.

The date of publishing (1981) could make the source less useful than other sources for challenging the view as it does not have the benefit of hindsight that the newer sources have. However, historians such as Burleigh could have read this and then used evidence to either further the judgment or argue with it. Broszat's association with the Third Reich does mean he would have had plenty of time to research and form his opinion by 1981, so this should add to the validity rather than detract from it.

RD 4

The regimes criminal policies were not in general, carried out by those who encouraged Hitler in his fanatical objectives and who intimidated his tirades in front of their own subordinates. This fell rather to the eager and obedient underlings in the system, who could be found even in the highest places and rapidly won the confidence of the clique at the centre of the regime precisely because of their blind loyalty and ruthlessness. Men like Hess, Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner were capable of terrifying perfectionism when it came to realizing schemes for the deportation or extermination of masses of people. They were driven by a variety of motive including ambition and vanity.

Hans Mommsen - from Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History (1992)

This next source is also valid for contradicting the main statement that 'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant'. Reference to "Hitler in his fanatical objectives... [and] tirades" makes him seem of less importance during WW2, and, in this viewpoint Mommsen says that "The regimes criminal policies.. fell to the eager and obedient underlings of the system" who were able to establish themselves in the centre of the regime through winning the confidence of the party [Hitler included] "because of their blind loyalty and ruthlessness". This source is also useful as it mentions who (namely "Hess, Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner") other than Hitler, can be to blame for the murderous turn of the Holocaust, denouncing the claim that 'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant' and supporting the structuralist argument.

Also making this source useful is Mommsen's clear message that "Hess Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner were capable of terrifying perfectionism... realizing schemes for deportation or extermination of masses of people". From this there can be no questioning the fact that Mommsen believes they were the ones who 'realized' the various schemes to make the Holocaust possible, and were the creators of a plan. The fact that they are said to have done this downplays the belief that Hitler had a plan to exterminate the Jews beforehand. Mommsen also gives us a reason to believe that these men would act in such a way as "Driven by a variety of motive including ambition and vanity." This makes the source more useful, particularly as we have reason to believe that Adolf Eichmann was a man with key involvement in Jewish evacuation and extermination. On July 31st he was given written authorization by Göring to plan for a "total solution of the Jewish Question". Furthermore, in November 1944, when Himmler ordered the Jewish extermination halted, Eichmann was appalled and continued even against official orders. This tells us something about Eichmann's disposition, and supports Mommsen's claim which challenges the intentionalist interpretation of Hitler in the Holocaust.

Mommsen believes that "Cumulative Radicalization" is the main reason why the Holocaust

happened. This view, which is also supported by Christopher Browning, is more reliable as it has been used by other historians to explain events leading to the murder of the Jews. Another reason which makes Mommsen's view reliable is his apt use of primary data. To strengthen his own judgment, he has been able to call upon Hitler's actions whilst in power - such as that of his lack of verbal confirmation on the Holocaust and also his lack of action in other areas, such as that of the church: where he did very little - and, thus call him a "weak dictator" who would be incapable of giving such orders. This is one of the reasons why Mommsen finds it hard to believe that Hitler had a 'clear and constant' eliminationist desire.

Of course one thing which could have influenced Mommsen's point of view is that he was born in Germany in 1930 and upholds left-wing political beliefs. This obviously suggests that Mommsen would have not supported the NSDAP as a right-wing party. However, as he was so young this might not have been the case. On the other hand, perhaps it was due to the fact that he grew up in a totalitarian environment which made him this way. Hence, if he was brought up being anti the NSDAP this could make the source less reliable as he could have wanted to blame the members of the party for what happened. This could limit the validity of his interpretation.

Furthermore, Mommsen has been criticised by other historians. Walter Hofer, a Swiss historian accused him of "not seeing because he does not want to see what Hofer saw as the obvious connection between what Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf* and his later actions" Hofer is obviously referring to the kind of link that Dawidowicz made as part of her intentionalist argument, and allegations such as this could reduce the validity of the source.

There is a reason to believe that Mommsen was influenced in part by his friend Martin Broszat, another structuralist historian. They worked together on their interpretation of the Third Reich. This could weaken his judgment in terms of reliability and, in turn utility if this were to mean that his ideas were less his own and more like Broszat's. However, I don't think this to be a massive issue as they are both highly regarded historians in their own right. Furthermore, it could simply enhance this judgment as we have two people working together to come to their own conclusions. Therefore, overall I find this source more useful than not to use to challenge the question set.

RD 5

This programme could not get fully underway until the spring of 1942, however, because neither the "factories of death" nor the "supply system" - the administrative and logistical apparatus necessary to deliver the victims - was in place. Between October 1941 and March 1942 the Nazi regime moved to remedy these deficiencies. It was a period, therefore, of initiation, experimentation, and preparation...After rejecting earlier proposals to begin deporting German Jews before the end of the war, Hitler not only approved deportations from the Third Reich in mid-September 1941 but pressed for as complete as possible evacuation by the end of the year. With no extermination camps yet in place, Himmler and Heydrich now faced great difficulties in fulfilling their master's wish."

Christopher Browning "The Origins of the Final Solution" (2003)

This source supports the structuralist side of the debate and challenges the interpretation in question. It draws our attention to the Final Solution and Hitler's role. In stating that [Hitler], "After

rejecting earlier proposals to begin deporting German Jews before the end of the war", we are able to assume that his first priority was not that of 'getting rid' of the Jews. His "approved deportations from the Third Reich in mid-September 1941" also help assess the question. From these statements we can draw upon Browning's understanding of the Third Reich that Hitler's questioning 'eliminationist desire' was most certainly not constant (as Hitler delayed in approving deportations) and might have not been as 'clear' as was previously thought. His reference to "deportations" and "no extermination camps yet in place" both suggest ambiguity concerning Hitler's intentions for the Jewish Question. Therefore, the source is useful as it supports that he did not have a plan from before he came to power blueprinting what he would do with the Jews, thus challenging the question.

The fact that this book was published in 2003 adds to the utility of the source, the fact that it was written by Browning who is a distinguished historian and professor with a reputation to uphold suggests it should be reliable. We can be sure that Browning undertook extensive research into the Holocaust before writing and publishing his book.

Browning refers to the "extermination camps" and continues "Himmler and Heydrich now faced great difficulties in fulfilling their master's wish" hence, we can ascertain that these people were making the decisions for the Final Solution on behalf of Hitler, whom they were simply trying to please. This could affect overall utility of the source as it suggests Hitler was behind anything going towards the Final Solution.

Christopher Browning is a moderate structuralist. His interpretation builds upon the idea that extermination of the Jews was a response to the self-imposed problem of Jewish-Ghettos imprisoning some 3 million Jews from between 1939 and 41 and the emergence of a polycratic regime. Browning's study prior to writing this book was obviously an influence on his final standpoint, in 1992 he had published a book "Ordinary Men" wherein he used Stanley Milgram's experiment which came to a conclusion that most people adhere to commands given, even if they are morally questionable. In his book, Browning concluded that it was ordinary people who did the killing of the helpless Jewish people during WW2. By taking on this idea, and the viewpoint that at this point Germany was under a polycratic rule, we can begin to form a basis for what happened and understand Browning's argument. It is possible that the decision to eliminate the Jews was made under the Third Reich in a confusing and irrational manner, and that the orders could have come from anywhere. From this, Browning is able to take emphasis away from Hitler being the root-cause of the Holocaust and also from Hitler having the plan to exterminate the Jews from the beginning, "With no extermination camps yet in place". Thus making this source a useful and reliable one for challenging the interpretation.

Something that adds to the reliability of this source is Browning's understanding of other historians in the field and his obvious acknowledgment of the two main schools of thought. During a speech given in Paris, he said ""For Lucy Dawidowicz, the Final Solution was thought out twenty years before it was put into practice; For Martin Broszat, the idea developed from the practice of sporadic murders of groups of Jews, which produced the idea of killing all Jews systematically."" In hindsight, Browning has obviously looked into the works of others which gears him up nicely to answer the question and helps to add validity to his viewpoint.

Furthermore, Browning was elected as a member of the American Arts and Sciences in 2006, one of the oldest and most prestigious societies and a leading centre for independent policy research. This proves his work is held in high esteem and makes his sources both useful and reliable for answering the question.

On the other hand, Browning's work has been criticised before. In response to Browning's thoughts on what caused the holocaust, Goldhagen said he missed the importance of German culture and of his book "Ordinary Men" that it was a "a book of no scholarly value and accused Browning of manufacturing his evidence." Browning has had his critics in the past. This might make his opinion slightly less valid.

However, it so happened that Goldhagen's book "Hitler's Willing Executioner's" -written in part as a rebuke against Browning's book- received even more criticism. Also, as "The Origins of the Final Solution" was published years after both of these texts, Browning most likely looked over the facts and thus, we can say that overall this source is a reliable and useful interpretation for challenging the view that Hitler was totally responsible for the Holocaust.

On reflection, the structuralist argument is the most convincing for explaining Hitler's role in the Holocaust and supports the idea that there was no clear plan.

The intentionalist debate is denounced by the fact that Hitler clearly did not have a plan before he came to power. One of the key sources of primary evidence that Intentionalists use would be that of Mein Kampf. Despite it being clear that Hitler was an Anti-Semite and evident he wanted to "get rid of the Jews" which he called the "satanic hosts". There is no substantial evidence telling us of a specific plan that Hitler himself wanted to carry out in terms of extermination on such a scale as that of the Holocaust.

The evidence supporting the structuralist viewpoint is much stronger. The Third Reich being a polycratic state and the Final Solution being a consequence of "accumulative Radicalisation" coincides with both primary and secondary evidence available. The nature of government of government in Nazi Germany suggested by Brozat and the radicalization of the Germans suggested by Mommsen are all concepts which are well supported by research and experience.

From Burleigh's source "Heydrich set out SS policy towards Polish Jews" we have proof that others were working on the Final Solution too. Furthermore, with Hitler having spent less and less time in Berlin as he sought refuge in his mountaintop retreat it would be naïve to assume that men such as this went to extreme lengths simply to be sycophants to a dictator such as Hitler. Historians such as Mommsen claim that Hitler's lack of verbal confirmation on the Holocaust (Ian Kershaw- The Unwritten Order) and also his lack of action in other areas; such as that of dealing with the Church, would have made him incapable of being the cornerstone behind such undertakings and suggest that a long term plan was not possible.

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'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant'

How valid is this assessment that the Holocaust was a long term plan?



Word Count –3785  

The 'Holocaust' is the term referring to the mass killing of 6 million Jews during WW2 under the Nazi regime. The primary targets for this act of genocide were Jews living in Europe. When investigating the root cause of the Holocaust, Historians have become divided as to whether Hitler had a plan: which was clear and constant from before he came to power, or whether this argument is too limited. There were clearly others who assumed positions of power within the Nazi Regime and would have participated in carrying out the holocaust- but how far should they bear responsibility for it? In order to separate this historiographical debate, the British marxist historian Timothy Mason coined the terms 'Intentionalist' and 'structuralist' respectively in order to represent the two views in an essay he wrote in 1981.

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Hitler could not have known that he was going to be in a position wherein he had any power in 1925 which also limits the idea that he had a clear plan to eliminate the Jews. The source is useful as it introduces the ideas of Anti-Semitism, proposes that steps need to be taken to “wipe out the Jewish state” and outlines his general wishes in terms of the Jews. However, under the circumstances we could also be looking at Hitler’s ideal for a time when he is not in charge. Hence he is able to write what he feels in an unrestricted way in Mein Kampf. Therefore, the ideas of others; namely his henchmen were the main force behind Anti-Semitic legislation.

On the other hand, this point can be argued. This source is primary evidence and it is reliable as it is Hitler’s viewpoint. He feels this way and so we can ascertain that he wanted to take action against the Jews and that he was an Anti-Semite. It can also be re-in forced through Hitler’s actions as chancellor because when he was in power Hitler followed this protocol. Ideas expressed were mirrored in his actions such as his extensive persecution of the Jewish people. And, even if the henchmen radicalised steps taken against the Jews, we know that Hitler must have agreed to them.

Born in Austria, Hitler’s upbringing would have helped him form his interpretation. At this time the wealthiest family in the village were Jewish and this might have encouraged a feeling of jealousy between him and the Jewish people. In 1908, Hitler travelled to Vienna and during this period would have spent his time –as a failed artist- living in a hostel. He would have seen wealthy Jews walking in the streets. This might have been the catalyst which fuelled his hatred towards them and desires to expose them. In 1918, the Jews were blamed for the failure of WW1; surrounding allegations such as communism. Due to this, there would have been a mutual negative feeling towards the Jewish people at this time. This would have made it easier for Hitler to form such Anti-Semitic feelings as it might have been considered acceptable. In other words, Anti-Semitism was a prevalent feeling in Germany, as it was in Europe. Hitler would not have been alone in his interpretation.

RD 2

Anti-Semitism was the core of Hitler's system of beliefs and the central motivation for his policies. He believed himself to be the savior who would bring redemption to the German people through the annihilation of the Jews, that people who embodied, in his eyes, the Satanic hosts.

Lucy Dawidowicz "The War against the Jews" (1975)

We could interpret this view in relation to the set question as suggesting that Hitler had an 'eliminationist desire' because he aimed to "bring redemption... through the annihilation of the Jews". Further to this, we can assume Dawidowicz believes this desire was 'clear' as, in this source she calls it the "central motivation for his [Hitler's] policies". Or, in other words, that the reason for his various legislative and foreign policy or the way in which he undertook his role as Fuhrer, was to fulfill this goal of killing the Jews "in his eyes, the satanic hosts". This would go a way to also prove his desires 'constant', hence this source is also clearly useful to support the intentionalist viewpoint.

A reason why the source may be considered less useful could be that in the paragraph leading up to the source, Dawidowicz claims "Without that assertive and enduring tradition of anti-Semitism by which the Germans sought self-definition" Hitler would not have been able to "grow his organization and spread its propaganda". By suggesting there were other factors involved i.e. the 'tradition of anti-Semitism' already in Germany, she could be weakening her own argument; saying that the regular Germans allowed the Holocaust to happen. You could also assume that this means that the eliminationist desire she hopes to prove, was not as clear or in fact as constant if Hitler needed the anti-Semitic beliefs of the people to push his policies forward. Therefore, the source could be considered to be of limited utility.

Dawidowicz was an American Zionist Jew, it is possible that her Jewish origin makes her susceptible to bias regarding her interpretation, especially as Kalmanovich and Reisen, some leading scholars she had become close to during her time working at the Yiddish Scientific Institute from 1938 were killed in the Holocaust. She had been close to Kalmanovich and his family, who she even described as being her real parents. However, as a well-recognised historian we must also say that her interpretation has some weight and this can give the source utility and reliability on the grounds that her evidence has been properly researched. She herself admits she was too passionate.

Factors which might have influenced her interpretation include her time spent in Poland after WW2. In 1946 she provided aid for Holocaust survivors and would have recognised that the population of Eastern European Jewry she had lived among before the war had been destroyed. She also would have seen the devastation the Holocaust had caused first hand. She met survivors and interviewed them. Further to this, Dawidowicz married a Polish Jew in 1948. Having such close relations with people affected by the Holocaust must have had some impact on how she formed her interpretation, she may also have formed her viewpoint as a defence mechanism against the people she had lost and she needed someone to blame for what happened during the war.

However, her close and immediate contact with survivors also means she had access to eye-witness sources which could give her a unique insight into the Holocaust. She witnessed the Nuremberg Trials and had access to transcripts of these trials. This will make her interpretation of events both

useful and reliable as she has her own primary experience to pair with the secondary research undertaken.

All these factors have an effect on value of her interpretation. However, predominantly we must conclude that the interpretation is still valid as first-hand experience is important when trying to evaluate how events occurred during the Holocaust and she is a well-researched historian.



RD 3

In that respect the practice of state very often failed to accord with the idea of the Führer state. The separation of the Führer from the government, his 'absence' and the growing difficulty for Ministers to get access to Hitler (particularly noticeable in the summer months which Hitler largely spent at Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden), frequently resulted in an uncoordinated juxtaposition of the Reich government and the Führer's authority.

Martin Broszat – Hitler state (1981)

This source gives the judgment that Hitler could not be held responsible for the Holocaust as he wasn't present in government at all times. This would suggest that the interpretation in the question is invalid. Broszat claims "his 'absence' and the growing difficulty for ministers to get access to Hitler... resulted in an uncoordinated juxtaposition of the Reich government and the Führer's authority." Therefore, any reference to a 'Führer state' would be wrong as there were others who took control during Hitler's absence e.g. Goebbels. For this reason, this source is useful in saying why Hitler's supposedly 'eliminationist desire' was not 'clear' or 'constant'.



Primary evidence proves that Hitler did spend an increasing amount of time away from Berlin and in his retreat at Obersalzberg. In 1935-6 the building was expanded and renamed the Burghof, where he spent more time than anywhere else during WW2, again suggesting that the Holocaust was not directed by Hitler. This supports the reliability of the source.

Martin Broszat, born in 1926 was a German historian/professor. The fact that he was German and that in 1944 as a university student he joined the SS would mean that he probably had first-hand knowledge with regard to the Holocaust. This could make the source useful as it means he had an insight into being a member of the SS and perhaps enabled him to appreciate –or at least understand- the chaotic nature of government in Nazi Germany from within.

One of Broszat's key ideas is that 'internal rivalry' within the Hitler state and party provided the driving force behind Nazi Germany. We know from other sources -both primary and secondary- that there was a rivalry to please Hitler or otherwise get to the top of Hitler's favour and perhaps this is what Broszat discovered during his time in the SS. Whether or not this is the case, the fact that this can be supported gives us reason to believe this source is reliable and useful.

It is possible that Mommsen had an influence on Broszat's judgment as they worked together for a time. This could make the source less reliable if Mommsen persuaded Broszat to take a more structuralist standpoint. However, as an independent historian Broszat would be able to evaluate the evidence collected by the Bavaria Project and formulate his own opinion about it.

The date of publishing (1981) could make the source less useful than other sources for challenging the view as it does not have the benefit of hindsight that the newer sources have. However, historians such as Burleigh could have read this and then used evidence to either further the judgment or argue with it. Broszat's association with the Third Reich does mean he would have had plenty of time to research and form his opinion by 1981, so this should add to the validity rather than detract from it.



RD 4

The regimes criminal policies were not in general, carried out by those who encouraged Hitler in his fanatical objectives and who intimidated his tirades in front of their own subordinates. This fell rather to the eager and obedient underlings in the system, who could be found even in the highest places and rapidly won the confidence of the clique at the centre of the regime precisely because of their blind loyalty and ruthlessness. Men like Hess, Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner were capable of terrifying perfectionism when it came to realizing schemes for the deportation or extermination of masses of people. They were driven by a variety of motive including ambition and vanity.

Hans Mommsen - from Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History (1992)



This next source is also valid for contradicting the main statement that 'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant'. Reference to "Hitler in his fanatical objectives... [and] tirades" makes him seem of less importance during WW2, and, in this viewpoint Mommsen says that "The regimes criminal policies.. fell to the eager and obedient underlings of the system" who were able to establish themselves in the centre of the regime through winning the confidence of the party [Hitler included] "because of their blind loyalty and ruthlessness". This source is also useful as it mentions who (namely "Hess, Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner") other than Hitler, can be to blame for the murderous turn of the Holocaust, denouncing the claim that 'Hitler's eliminationist desire was clear and constant' and supporting the structuralist argument.

Also making this source useful is Mommsen's clear message that "Hess Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner were capable of terrifying perfectionism... realizing schemes for deportation or extermination of masses of people". From this there can be no questioning the fact that Mommsen believes they were the ones who 'realized' the various schemes to make the Holocaust possible, and were the creators of a plan. The fact that they are said to have done this downplays the belief that Hitler had a plan to exterminate the Jews beforehand. Mommsen also gives us a reason to believe that these men would act in such a way as "Driven by a variety of motive including ambition and vanity." This makes the source more useful, particularly as we have reason to believe that Adolf Eichmann was a man with key involvement in Jewish evacuation and extermination. On July 31st he was given written authorization by Göring to plan for a "total solution of the Jewish Question". Furthermore, in November 1944, when Himmler ordered the Jewish extermination halted, Eichmann was appalled and continued even against official orders. This tells us something about Eichmann's disposition, and supports Mommsen's claim which challenges the intentionalist interpretation of Hitler in the Holocaust.

Mommsen believes that "Cumulative Radicalization" is the main reason why the Holocaust

happened. This view, which is also supported by Christopher Browning, is more reliable as it has been used by other historians to explain events leading to the murder of the Jews. Another reason which makes Mommsen's view reliable is his apt use of primary data. To strengthen his own judgment, he has been able to call upon Hitler's actions whilst in power - such as that of his lack of verbal confirmation on the Holocaust and also his lack of action in other areas, such as that of the church: where he did very little - and, thus call him a "weak dictator" who would be incapable of giving such orders. This is one of the reasons why Mommsen finds it hard to believe that Hitler had a 'clear and constant' eliminationist desire.

Of course one thing which could have influenced Mommsen's point of view is that he was born in Germany in 1930 and upholds left-wing political beliefs. This obviously suggests that Mommsen would have not supported the NSDAP as a right-wing party. However, as he was so young this might not have been the case. On the other hand, perhaps it was due to the fact that he grew up in a totalitarian environment which made him this way. Hence, if he was brought up being anti the NSDAP this could make the source less reliable as he could have wanted to blame the members of the party for what happened. This could limit the validity of his interpretation.

Furthermore, Mommsen has been criticised by other historians. Walter Hofer, a Swiss historian accused him of "not seeing because he does not want to see what Hofer saw as the obvious connection between what Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf* and his later actions" Hofer is obviously referring to the kind of link that Dawidowicz made as part of her intentionalist argument, and allegations such as this could reduce the validity of the source.



There is a reason to believe that Mommsen was influenced in part by his friend Martin Broszat, another structuralist historian. They worked together on their interpretation of the Third Reich. This could weaken his judgment in terms of reliability and, in turn utility if this were to mean that his ideas were less his own and more like Broszat's. However, I don't think this to be a massive issue as they are both highly regarded historians in their own right. Furthermore, it could simply enhance this judgment as we have two people working together to come to their own conclusions. Therefore, overall I find this source more useful than not to use to challenge the question set.



RD 5

This programme could not get fully underway until the spring of 1942, however, because neither the "factories of death" nor the "supply system" - the administrative and logistical apparatus necessary to deliver the victims - was in place. Between October 1941 and March 1942 the Nazi regime moved to remedy these deficiencies. It was a period, therefore, of initiation, experimentation, and preparation...After rejecting earlier proposals to begin deporting German Jews before the end of the war, Hitler not only approved deportations from the Third Reich in mid-September 1941 but pressed for as complete as possible evacuation by the end of the year. With no extermination camps yet in place, Himmler and Heydrich now faced great difficulties in fulfilling their master's wish."

Christopher Browning "The Origins of the Final Solution" (2003)

This source supports the structuralist side of the debate and challenges the interpretation in question. It draws our attention to the Final Solution and Hitler's role. In stating that [Hitler], "After



rejecting earlier proposals to begin deporting German Jews before the end of the war", we are able to assume that his first priority was not that of 'getting rid' of the Jews. His "approved deportations from the Third Reich in mid-September 1941" also help assess the question. From these statements we can draw upon Browning's understanding of the Third Reich that Hitler's questioning 'eliminationist desire' was most certainly not constant (as Hitler delayed in approving deportations) and might have not been as 'clear' as was previously thought. His reference to "deportations" and "no extermination camps yet in place" both suggest ambiguity concerning Hitler's intentions for the Jewish Question. Therefore, the source is useful as it supports that he did not have a plan from before he came to power blueprinting what he would do with the Jews, thus challenging the question.

The fact that this book was published in 2003 adds to the utility of the source, the fact that it was written by Browning who is a distinguished historian and professor with a reputation to uphold suggests it should be reliable. We can be sure that Browning undertook extensive research into the Holocaust before writing and publishing his book.

Browning refers to the "extermination camps" and continues "Himmler and Heydrich now faced great difficulties in fulfilling their master's wish" hence, we can ascertain that these people were making the decisions for the Final Solution on behalf of Hitler, whom they were simply trying to please. This could affect overall utility of the source as it suggests Hitler was behind anything going towards the Final Solution.

Christopher Browning is a moderate structuralist. His interpretation builds upon the idea that extermination of the Jews was a response to the self-imposed problem of Jewish-Ghettos imprisoning some 3 million Jews from between 1939 and 41 and the emergence of a polycratic regime. Browning's study prior to writing this book was obviously an influence on his final standpoint, in 1992 he had published a book "Ordinary Men" wherein he used Stanley Milgram's experiment which came to a conclusion that most people adhere to commands given, even if they are morally questionable. In his book, Browning concluded that it was ordinary people who did the killing of the helpless Jewish people during WW2. By taking on this idea, and the viewpoint that at this point Germany was under a polycratic rule, we can begin to form a basis for what happened and understand Browning's argument. It is possible that the decision to eliminate the Jews was made under the Third Reich in a confusing and irrational manner, and that the orders could have come from anywhere. From this, Browning is able to take emphasis away from Hitler being the root-cause of the Holocaust and also from Hitler having the plan to exterminate the Jews from the beginning, "With no extermination camps yet in place". Thus making this source a useful and reliable one for challenging the interpretation.

Something that adds to the reliability of this source is Browning's understanding of other historians in the field and his obvious acknowledgment of the two main schools of thought. During a speech given in Paris, he said ""For Lucy Dawidowicz, the Final Solution was thought out twenty years before it was put into practice; For Martin Broszat, the idea developed from the practice of sporadic murders of groups of Jews, which produced the idea of killing all Jews systematically."" In hindsight, Browning has obviously looked into the works of others which gears him up nicely to answer the question and helps to add validity to his viewpoint.

Furthermore, Browning was elected as a member of the American Arts and Sciences in 2006, one of the oldest and most prestigious societies and a leading centre for independent policy research. This proves his work is held in high esteem and makes his sources both useful and reliable for answering the question.

On the other hand, Browning's work has been criticised before. In response to Browning's thoughts on what caused the holocaust, Goldhagen said he missed the importance of German culture and of his book "Ordinary Men" that it was a "a book of no scholarly value and accused Browning of manufacturing his evidence." Browning has had his critics in the past. This might make his opinion slightly less valid.

However, it so happened that Goldhagen's book "Hitler's Willing Executioner's" -written in part as a rebuke against Browning's book- received even more criticism. Also, as "The Origins of the Final Solution" was published years after both of these texts, Browning most likely looked over the facts and thus, we can say that overall this source is a reliable and useful interpretation for challenging the view that Hitler was totally responsible for the Holocaust.



On reflection, the structuralist argument is the most convincing for explaining Hitler's role in the Holocaust and supports the idea that there was no clear plan.

The intentionalist debate is denounced by the fact that Hitler clearly did not have a plan before he came to power. One of the key sources of primary evidence that Intentionalists use would be that of Mein Kampf. Despite it being clear that Hitler was an Anti-Semite and evident he wanted to "get rid of the Jews" which he called the "satanic hosts". There is no substantial evidence telling us of a specific plan that Hitler himself wanted to carry out in terms of extermination on such a scale as that of the Holocaust.

The evidence supporting the structuralist viewpoint is much stronger. The Third Reich being a polycratic state and the Final Solution being a consequence of "accumulative Radicalisation" coincides with both primary and secondary evidence available. The nature of government of government in Nazi Germany suggested by Brozat and the radicalization of the Germans suggested by Mommsen are all concepts which are well supported by research and experience.

From Burleigh's source "Heydrich set out SS policy towards Polish Jews" we have proof that others were working on the Final Solution too. Furthermore, with Hitler having spent less and less time in Berlin as he sought refuge in his mountaintop retreat it would be naïve to assume that men such as this went to extreme lengths simply to be sycophants to a dictator such as Hitler. Historians such as Mommsen claim that Hitler's lack of verbal confirmation on the Holocaust (Ian Kershaw- The Unwritten Order) and also his lack of action in other areas; such as that of dealing with the Church, would have made him incapable of being the cornerstone behind such undertakings and suggest that a long term plan was not possible.



Marks awarded by the moderator:



Suggestions for improvement:



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RD 1:

Hitler's Autobiography "Mein Kampf" (1925)

RD 2:

Lucy Dawidowicz "The War against the Jews" (1975)

RD 3:

Martin Broszat – The Hitler State (1981)

RD 4:

Hans Mommsen - from 'Weimar to Auschwitz': Essays in German History (1992)

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"The Civil War was a Lost Cause from the start."

How valid is this interpretation of the Confederate defeat in the American Civil War?

By definition, a 'lost cause' is a cause for which defeat is completely inevitable. The Southern war effort has been portrayed as a lost cause, and this, in fact, was one of the most popular schools of thought from the 1860s right up to the 1920s and even later. The common point of the Lost Cause argument is the simple notion that the Confederacy did not have the money, resources or population to win a war against the powerhouse of the North. For example, the population of the Confederacy was 9.5 million compared with the Union's 21 million. Although the odds for Southern victory were incredibly slim, to call it a lost cause from the start could be a step too far.

Historians reviewing the causes of the Confederacy's defeat now realise that a far inferior nation are capable of toppling a powerful nation. This tells us that although it is possible to see how the Confederate's defeat in the American Civil War could be argued as a lost cause, there is room for further interpretation.

The idea that the American Civil War was a lost cause is a particularly outmoded interpretation of the war. The term was first used in 1866, just one year after the war ended, by a Southern historian named Edward Pollard. However, articles written by Jubal Early in the 1870s truly cemented the Lost Cause ideology in Southern culture. The Lost Cause view is predominantly a Southern romanticised opinion of the war aimed at consoling the demoralised Southern population. This perspective was allowed to flourish by the North in order to ease Southern reinstatement into the Union. Lost Cause theorists believe that had the South been on an even footing with the Union at the start of the war, they would have won, however, their disadvantage in population, number of ships, manufacturing factories, gold reserves and international trading partners meant the South never had a chance.

Own source 1

"The South was way outclassed industrially. There was probably never any chance of it winning without European recognition and military aid. And we can now see in retrospect what some, like Jefferson Davis, even saw at the time, which was that there was never any real hope of Europe intervening. It just never was in England or France's interests to get involved in a North American war that would inevitably have wound up doing great damage, especially to England's maritime trade."

William C. Davis, a Southern historian and former editor of the Civil War Times, speaking in an interview from 1999.

Although most modern historians have moved onto more current schools of thought about why the South lost the war, source 1 demonstrates that some historians still believe that the war was a lost cause for the Confederacy. William C. Davis argues that industrial inferiority was a major cause of the Southern defeat. However, he states that the true reason was because no European power ever supported the Confederacy and, therefore, this doomed the rebelling nation to failure from the offset.

The fact that this source was written relatively recently, in 1995, tells us that it may not be as much of a tool of consolidation but rather a valuable viewpoint. As a Southern historian living in Virginia, the heartland of lingering Confederate sentiment, we would expect W.C.Davis to have been brought up surrounded by stories of the War and how it was a lost cause. However, in my opinion W.C.Davis does not show bias in this extract. His comment does not romanticise the war at all but rather puts the Lost Cause theory in a different perspective to the classic lost cause argument. The time this source was written, in the Post-revisionist period, would also allow W.C.Davis to evaluate the mistakes within the Revisionist argument, giving him a more conservative view on the war. However, the extract itself may have been taken out of context of his wider views.

Arguments against the Lost Cause theory began to develop at the start of the 20th century. However, it truly came to a head during the revisionist period when the issues and concerns of the Vietnam War were on-going. The argument states that in history many weaker armies have overcome powerful nations, so, why couldn't the Confederacy? In all of these cases the defending army has, however, had the support of more powerful nations. Russia and China substantially supported Vietnam with weapons and money during the USA-Vietnam War. During the American War of Independence the rebellious American Colonies were supported by Britain's European rivals, France and Spain.

Although W.C.Davis is a Southern man, I believe this extract is not aimed at romanticising the war or of consolidating Southern honour but rather it highlights the fact that the war was always going to be a lost cause for the South. The lack of international recognition and any external help was diminished due to fierce international political lobbying from US representatives.

Own source 2

In the opinion of many competent persons, he was the ablest commander of them all. I remember a remarkable utterance of his when we were speaking of Grant's campaign. "There was a difference," Sherman said, "between Grant's and my way of looking at things. Grant never cared a damn about what was going on behind the enemy's lines, but it often scared me like the devil." He admitted, and justly so, that some of Grant's successes were owing to this very fact, but also some of his most conspicuous failures.

Grant believed in hammering - Sherman in maneuvering. It had been the habit of the generals commanding the Army of the Potomac to cross the Rappahannock, to get their drubbing from Lee, and then promptly to retreat and recross the Rappahannock again in retreat. He sturdily went on, hammering and hammering, and, with his vastly superior resources, finally hammered Lee's army to pieces, but with a most dreadful sacrifice of life on his own part. Now, comparing Grant's campaign for the taking of Richmond with Sherman's campaign for the taking of Atlanta - without losing sight of any of the differences of their respective situations - we may well arrive at the conclusion that Sherman was the superior strategist and the greater general.

Carl Schurz wrote about the relative merits of Ulysses S. Grant, William Sherman and Robert E. Lee in his autobiography *the reminiscences of Carl Schurz* published in 1907-08.

Although the Lost Cause school of thought is generalised as a Southern romanticised view on the war, source 2 contrasts with this idea. Carl Schurz was a German immigrant and by

was speaking at a veterans meeting meant he would inevitably tell the ex-soldiers what they would have wanted to hear, the basis of this being a romantic memory of the War depicting them as valiant soldiers comparable with tales of ancient Greek warriors.

These sources suggest that the Lost Cause interpretation can in fact be sub-divided into the *romanticised* lost cause of the South and an alternative *pragmatic* lost cause view. The myth of the Lost Cause has been distorted to present the South as gallant in defeat while upholding their honour against the oppression of the North. However, the Lost Cause argument does not need to be exaggerated as much as it has been. Many historians disregard the idea of the Lost Cause as unrealistic due to the overstated romanticism and Vietnam proving a small nation can defeat a large nation. The factor people neglect to remember is that during the American Civil War the Confederacy stood alone unlike the Vietcong who were greatly helped by outside powers.

The war the South fought had a different geographical situation to the Vietnam War or the American Revolution. The British and American soldiers going to Vietnam and the American Colonies, respectively, were travelling halfway around the world. The defending nations had support, weapons and fought guerrilla-style tactics to wear down their foe until public opinion turned against them. The Confederate capital, Richmond, was only 106 miles from Washington D.C. A war of attrition and guerrilla warfare was never a realistic option and led to the South adopting their offensive-defensive tactic aiming to quickly break Northern morale or bring Britain into the war.

Although the idea that the war was inevitably a lost cause for the Confederacy is widely criticised, I believe that in the right context with the correct supporting evidence that the Lost Cause concept is entirely realistic.

Own source 4

Grant rejected the Lost Cause argument that the South had simply been overwhelmed by numbers. Grant argued, "This is the way public opinion was made during the war and this is the way history is made now. We never overwhelmed the South ... What we won from the South we won by hard fighting."

Ulysses S. Grant, speaking in an 1878 interview, discussing the theory of the Lost Cause.

Many people have opposed the Lost Cause, claiming it to simply be a myth dreamt up by 'public opinion' in the wounded Southern nation. Ulysses Grant, commonly portrayed as an alcoholic and an unskilled butcher of the Union army, blatantly stands against the idea that the war as a lost cause. Grant states that the North never truly overwhelmed the South but instead won after years of hard fighting.

Grant's quote comes a year after his second term in office which was plagued by scandal leading to criticism of Grant. Along with his portrayal by the South during the war I believe Grant's statement is fuelled by his dissatisfaction of his depiction, allowing room for bias in his statement. The condemnation of Grant's time as a general and in office would have impacted greatly on Grant as the public agreed with the Lost Cause theory. It would make sense that Grant would wish to express his feelings against the Lost Cause school of thought after the great efforts he went through to secure victory for the Union.

This source shows the slow movement of opinion away from the Lost Cause school, towards the Progressive school of thought, where historians focused less on the idea that the war was an inevitable defeat for the South and searched for other factors. The First and Second World Wars, fought during the progressive period, caused many historians to focus on the battle-front as Grant does in this source.

Many people in the North held this view on the Southern version of the war but chose not to argue against it in order to maintain peace with the rehabilitated South.

When evaluating the cause of the Southern defeat, a major factor that must be accounted for is the political leadership of the two nations. The differences between Lincoln and Jefferson Davis's abilities have often been compared by historians. This is reflected in source 5, an extract from an interview with James McPherson, a seminal American Civil War historian.

Own source 5

Resources were a necessary condition for Union victory, it is not a sufficient explanation for that victory. Neither are the internal divisions within the Confederacy sufficient explanation for its defeat, because the North also suffered sharp internal divisions between those who supported a war for the abolition of slavery and those who resisted it, between Republicans and Democrats, between Unionists and Copperheads. And, in fact, the North probably suffered from greater internal disunity than the Confederacy.

Superior leadership is a possible explanation for Union victory. Abraham Lincoln was probably a better war president than Jefferson Davis and certainly offered a better explanation to his own people of what they were fighting for than Davis was able to offer. By the latter half of the war, Northern military leadership had evolved a coherent strategy for victory which involved the destruction of Confederate armies but went beyond that to the destruction of Confederate resources to wage war, including the resource of slavery, the South's labor power. By the time Grant had become general-in-chief and Sherman his chief subordinate and Sheridan one of his hardest-hitting field commanders, the North had evolved a strategy that in the end completely destroyed the Confederacy's ability to wage war. And that combination of strategic leadership—both at the political level with Lincoln and the military level with Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—is what in the end explains Northern victory.

James M. McPherson, a professor of history at Princeton University, speaking in an interview with Carl Zebrowski about 'why the South lost the civil war?' (1999).


McPherson argues several different causes as to why the South lost the War. With regard to divisions in the Southern home-front. McPherson states it cannot be compared to the 'sharp internal divisions' in the Union. The Northern political conflict meant the Confederates' greatest hope of success was for Lincoln to lose the 1864 presidential election. McPherson states Lincoln was a better leader, as he explained to the public *why* they should keep fighting; furthermore, the Generals evolved their strategy 'that in the end completely destroyed the Confederacy's ability to wage war'. McPherson seemingly agrees with Grant that the Union defeated the South over five years of hard fighting. It can also be interpreted that superior Northern leadership, politically and eventually in the military, did in fact make

Lincoln was, however, rather unpopular in the North up until mid-1863, because the War was not going well for the North. As his political opposition happily pointed out, the War was Lincoln's choice and this made the 1864 election very difficult. In truth had the South won the Battle of Gettysburg then Lincoln may well have lost the election to the peace democrats, this gives an alternative perspective on whether the war was in fact a lost cause.

I believe this is a reliable source with seemingly no bias towards North or South, instead giving a balanced answer as to why the South lost the Civil War. McPherson writes this source so long after the war that he has no reason to show prejudice and, as a military historian, McPherson in fact removes any political or geographical issue from the argument looking at the basics of the war-front and leadership. However, as a military historian, McPherson creates a potential for bias, as he would naturally concentrate less on the social causes for the Confederate defeat; this must be taken into account when reviewing his work.

Written in the 1990s this quote certainly fits into the Post-revisionist school of thought. As is common with many Post-revisionist historians, McPherson moves away from the revisionist tendency for exaggerating trivial factors and focuses instead on important issues of the battle-front and leadership. Ultimately, in all wars these two key factors will inevitably be the major cause of war as no army can win a war without strength in these two areas.

Own Source 6



"Presidential Cobblers and Wire-Pullers Measuring and Estimating Lincoln's Shoes" by Frank Bellew. New York Illustrated News, Mar 5, 1864, page 297.

Source 6 shows Lincoln as a sleeping giant whose big boots will be difficult to fill despite the efforts of the miniature 'presidential cobblers and wire-pullers' attempting to measure them up and take the Presidency from Lincoln in the 1864 election.

This cartoon supports Lincoln by presenting him as a strong leader with boots too large to fill by any of his adversaries. The cartoon does, however, hint that Lincoln certainly had his problems with great competition for the presidency from many challengers but, in the end, Lincoln would be the only man capable of leading the Union to victory. The cartoon was published in the *New York Illustrated News*, a supporter of the Lincoln administration, and the illustration is certainly a piece of propaganda aiming to maintain public support in Lincoln as the man to lead the Union to success. It is biased towards Lincoln and published just before the general election took place thus seeking to sway any voters sitting on the fence into voting for the Republicans.

It took Lincoln until 1864 to find the right general to win the War. He was not confident enough on an all-out attack on the Confederacy which may have led to a more rapid Northern victory. This shows that Lincoln's leadership may not have been as influential a factor in the Confederate defeat. However, in comparison with Davis we see how Lincoln brought order to his cabinet and control to the home-front. Davis aggravated fellow compatriots, there were regular changes of cabinet personnel and he failed to enforce conscription. The issues Lincoln faced appear to outweigh Davis's; therefore, it is possible that had Lincoln been the Confederate president, he would have been able to solve the problems facing the Confederacy.

This lends great weight to the idea that Lincoln's ability as president was important as to why the South lost the Civil War, however, had Davis received European support and trade the South may have had a greater chance at victory. I still believe the War would have been a lost cause for the Confederacy, whoever the president, provided that they received no support from powerful global nations.

Own source 7

Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery alone can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive. It is due under Almighty God, to the skill and resolution of General Beauregard, the admirable conduct of Generals Bee, Kirby Smith and Jackson and of the Colonel Evans, Cocke, Early and Elzey, and the courage, and unyielding firmness of our patriotic volunteers.

General Joseph E. Johnston, report on the battle of Bull Run (June, 1861).

No matter how influential a leader is, a war will inevitably be won and lost in one place; on the battlefield. If the War is to be interpreted as a lost cause for the Confederacy then they should have had no chance of victory against the North due to shortages in equipment and available population to fight.

The battle of Bull Run was the first major battle of the American Civil War and the South won an almost complete victory according to this report from Confederate General Johnston. Although it was a great victory for the South there may well be bias in this report as Johnston seeks to embellish his own reputation in order to inscribe his legacy in Civil War history. Jefferson Davis did not feel Johnston pressed his advantage well enough for a truly complete victory, conversely, Johnston felt he did not have sufficient cavalry to make the battle truly decisive. This indicates either a lack of communication between the politicians and the military or insufficient support.

The South dominated the first two years of the war, winning a number of large battles. This can be interpreted as the South having an advantage in military ability, a factor which must show that the War was not a lost cause, as the Rebels were easily able to stand up to the Union forces. This strong start to the war from the Confederate army, probably due to the Southern soldier's greater reason to fight for their family and homes and a greater knowledge of the terrain, gave the South an advantage but does not demonstrate they could ultimately win the war.

The war did, however, go downhill for the Confederacy, despite a string of victories and with Lincoln looking unlikely to be re-elected. The turning point of the War is seemingly the battle of Gettysburg. The Union were victorious and Lee's invading army of West Virginia suffered large numbers of casualties due to his tactics.

Additionally, Gettysburg caused serious damage to the morale of the South, as many of the Confederate soldiers' two year contracts came to an end in 1863. Low morale at home saw many veterans not re-enlisting and soldiers deserting and returning home to support their families. This was a key cause of the South failing to continue to win the War on the battle-front as they did not have the manpower to continue waging an offensive-defensive war.

Had a powerful nation supported the Confederacy, the blockade could have been broken and trade could have occurred with Europe and shortages of goods on the home and war-front would have been more regular. This would have led to more men re-enlisting once their contracts ended as they would have known their families were living comfortably.

Demoralisation occurred on the home-front not only due to shortages of food and basic necessities but also due to fear. There was fear of a Northern invasion, such as the taking of Atlanta, but there was also a great fear of a slave uprising.

Own source 8

My mother came for us at the end of the year 1865, and demanded that her children be given up to her. This, mistress refused to do, and threatened to set the dogs on my mother if she did not at once leave the place. My mother went away, and remained with some of the neighbors until supper time. Then she got a boy to tell Caroline to come down to the fence. When she came, my mother told her to go back and get Henry and myself and bring us down to the gap in the fence as quick as she could. Then my mother took Henry in her arms, and my sister carried me on her back. We climbed fences and crossed fields, and after several hours came to a little hut which my mother had secured on a plantation. We had no more than reached the place, and made a little fire, when master's two sons rode up and demanded that the children be returned. My mother refused to give us up. Upon her offering to go with them to the Yankee headquarters to find out if it were really true that all negroes had been made free, the young men left, and troubled us no more.

The mother of Annie L. Burton ran away during the Civil War. She returned afterwards to claim her slave children. She recorded the incident in her book, *Memories of Childhood's Slavery Days* (1909).

Throughout the first half of the 19th century, it was a common occurrence for slaves to run away from their masters through the Underground Railroad. During the war many slaves

saw their chance to escape captivity; source 8 comes from a runaway slave's memoirs. The influence of the Union forces being in the South gave slaves greater confidence at escaping.

This source may not be reliable as it holds the risk of being biased because the author may have elaborated her story for financial gain. As a young child Annie Burton's memory of the event may not be a true representation of what actually happened because her recollection forty years later would be selective. Furthermore, the highly emotive nature of the source brings into question its validity because the obvious trauma experienced.

Burton's memoirs were written in the progressive period. Progressive historians used such information to highlight the internal race conflict in Southern society as the reason for the Confederate loss. Moreover, progressive historians wrote in a period where progressive reformation of the USA was needed and extracts such as source 8 were used to understand the dynamics of American society.

A slave uprising caused fear in the South but runaway slaves also damaged the Confederacy's war effort by removing Southern workers who were necessary in producing the food and cotton used to clothe and feed the rebel forces.

The 14th amendment and the effect of runaway slaves was an important cause of the Southern defeat. The Southern fear of a slave uprising limited the use of armed slaves on the war-front, as many Southerners were apprehensive of giving their slaves weapons. This impact must not, however, be overestimated. I believe little would have changed regarding the outcome of the war as the majority of slaves remained in captivity.

The fact that the North had almost three times as many black men serving in the army than the Confederacy, even though forty percent of the population of the South were slaves shows the inability of the Southern Government to truly mobilise all the resources at their disposal. It also shows the emotional willingness of black Americans to volunteer for the North.

Although the Southern defeat cannot be put directly down to any one factor, I believe that the War was always a lost cause for the Confederate States. As shown in my sources, the impact of leaders on the battlefield and in Government greatly influenced the outcome of the war, especially the short-comings of Jefferson Davis in maintaining morale on the home-front and maximising the output of the South for the War effort. This greatly hindered the ability of the South to win the War. Similarly, mistakes from Robert Lee and his high casualty tactics in the first half of the war was a turning point as the South no longer had the soldiers to fight an offensive-defensive war. Black people played a fairly important role in the War and Jefferson Davis' inability at mobilising this great workforce for the military may well have been a major cause for Southern defeat.

I believe the War was a lost cause, not in the traditional, romanticised sense of the Lost Cause theory, but in a more realistic sense. I believe the traditional Southern lost cause school of thought is, in fact, quite damaging to a historical view of the American Civil War. It leads to the common disregarding of the realistic aspects of the Lost Cause argument as it is easy to group lost cause theories together and criticise them as one amalgamation.

In my opinion the Lost Cause argument does not need to be exaggerated or distorted by Southern pride. The simple fact that the South stood alone during the Civil War, unlike the examples used by lost cause critics, shows the major reason the South would inevitably lose the War. Without aid from a powerful nation, the internal markets of the Confederacy would certainly collapse; this caused inflation, loss of public morale which in turn saw many soldiers returning home. Without an ally in Europe to support them I believe the South had no chance of winning the war.

Similarly, I believe public opinion in the North would never be strong enough to see the Union choose peace over seeing out the War. The Confederacy bordered the Union; they could not win as they did not have the strength to occupy the Union, and the fact it was a part of the Union meant the public were generally inclined to believe it was their right to retake the South. Overall, I believe the South could never have won the war without foreign intervention and aid, and thus the Civil War was a lost cause from the start.

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"The Civil War was a Lost Cause from the start."

How valid is this interpretation of the Confederate defeat in the American Civil War?

By definition, a 'lost cause' is a cause for which defeat is completely inevitable. The Southern war effort has been portrayed as a lost cause, and this, in fact, was one of the most popular schools of thought from the 1860s right up to the 1920s and even later. The common point of the Lost Cause argument is the simple notion that the Confederacy did not have the money, resources or population to win a war against the powerhouse of the North. For example, the population of the Confederacy was 9.5 million compared with the Union's 21 million. Although the odds for Southern victory were incredibly slim, to call it a lost cause from the start could be a step too far.



Historians reviewing the causes of the Confederacy's defeat now realise that a far inferior nation are capable of toppling a powerful nation. This tells us that although it is possible to see how the Confederate's defeat in the American Civil War could be argued as a lost cause, there is room for further interpretation.

The idea that the American Civil War was a lost cause is a particularly outmoded interpretation of the war. The term was first used in 1866, just one year after the war ended, by a Southern historian named Edward Pollard. However, articles written by Jubal Early in the 1870s truly cemented the Lost Cause ideology in Southern culture. The Lost Cause view is predominantly a Southern romanticised opinion of the war aimed at consoling the demoralised Southern population. This perspective was allowed to flourish by the North in order to ease Southern reinstatement into the Union. Lost Cause theorists believe that had the South been on an even footing with the Union at the start of the war, they would have won, however, their disadvantage in population, number of ships, manufacturing factories, gold reserves and international trading partners meant the South never had a chance.



Own source 1



"The South was way outclassed industrially. There was probably never any chance of it winning without European recognition and military aid. And we can now see in retrospect what some, like Jefferson Davis, even saw at the time, which was that there was never any real hope of Europe intervening. It just never was in England or France's interests to get involved in a North American war that would inevitably have wound up doing great damage, especially to England's maritime trade."

William C. Davis, a Southern historian and former editor of the Civil War Times, speaking in an interview from 1999.

Although most modern historians have moved onto more current schools of thought about why the South lost the war, source 1 demonstrates that some historians still believe that the war was a lost cause for the Confederacy. William C. Davis argues that industrial inferiority was a major cause of the Southern defeat. However, he states that the true reason was because no European power ever supported the Confederacy and, therefore, this doomed the rebelling nation to failure from the offset.



The fact that this source was written relatively recently, in 1995, tells us that it may not be as much of a tool of consolidation but rather a valuable viewpoint. As a Southern historian living in Virginia, the heartland of lingering Confederate sentiment, we would expect W.C.Davis to have been brought up surrounded by stories of the War and how it was a lost cause. However, in my opinion W.C.Davis does not show bias in this extract. His comment does not romanticise the war at all but rather puts the Lost Cause theory in a different perspective to the classic lost cause argument. The time this source was written, in the Post-revisionist period, would also allow W.C.Davis to evaluate the mistakes within the Revisionist argument, giving him a more conservative view on the war. However, the extract itself may have been taken out of context of his wider views.

Arguments against the Lost Cause theory began to develop at the start of the 20th century. However, it truly came to a head during the revisionist period when the issues and concerns of the Vietnam War were on-going. The argument states that in history many weaker armies have overcome powerful nations, so, why couldn't the Confederacy? In all of these cases the defending army has, however, had the support of more powerful nations. Russia and China substantially supported Vietnam with weapons and money during the USA-Vietnam War. During the American War of Independence the rebellious American Colonies were supported by Britain's European rivals, France and Spain.

Although W.C.Davis is a Southern man, I believe this extract is not aimed at romanticising the war or of consolidating Southern honour but rather it highlights the fact that the war was always going to be a lost cause for the South. The lack of international recognition and any external help was diminished due to fierce international political lobbying from US representatives.

Own source 2

In the opinion of many competent persons, he was the ablest commander of them all. I remember a remarkable utterance of his when we were speaking of Grant's campaign. "There was a difference," Sherman said, "between Grant's and my way of looking at things. Grant never cared a damn about what was going on behind the enemy's lines, but it often scared me like the devil." He admitted, and justly so, that some of Grant's successes were owing to this very fact, but also some of his most conspicuous failures.

Grant believed in hammering - Sherman in maneuvering. It had been the habit of the generals commanding the Army of the Potomac to cross the Rappahannock, to get their drubbing from Lee, and then promptly to retreat and recross the Rappahannock again in retreat. He sturdily went on, hammering and hammering, and, with his vastly superior resources, finally hammered Lee's army to pieces, but with a most dreadful sacrifice of life on his own part. Now, comparing Grant's campaign for the taking of Richmond with Sherman's campaign for the taking of Atlanta - without losing sight of any of the differences of their respective situations - we may well arrive at the conclusion that Sherman was the superior strategist and the greater general.

Carl Schurz wrote about the relative merits of Ulysses S. Grant, William Sherman and Robert E. Lee in his autobiography *the reminiscences of Carl Schurz* published in 1907-08.

Although the Lost Cause school of thought is generalised as a Southern romanticised view on the war, source 2 contrasts with this idea. Carl Schurz was a German immigrant and by

was speaking at a veterans meeting meant he would inevitably tell the ex-soldiers what they would have wanted to hear, the basis of this being a romantic memory of the War depicting them as valiant soldiers comparable with tales of ancient Greek warriors.

These sources suggest that the Lost Cause interpretation can in fact be sub-divided into the *romanticised* lost cause of the South and an alternative *pragmatic* lost cause view. The myth of the Lost Cause has been distorted to present the South as gallant in defeat while upholding their honour against the oppression of the North. However, the Lost Cause argument does not need to be exaggerated as much as it has been. Many historians disregard the idea of the Lost Cause as unrealistic due to the overstated romanticism and Vietnam proving a small nation can defeat a large nation. The factor people neglect to remember is that during the American Civil War the Confederacy stood alone unlike the Vietcong who were greatly helped by outside powers.

The war the South fought had a different geographical situation to the Vietnam War or the American Revolution. The British and American soldiers going to Vietnam and the American Colonies, respectively, were travelling halfway around the world. The defending nations had support, weapons and fought guerrilla-style tactics to wear down their foe until public opinion turned against them. The Confederate capital, Richmond, was only 106 miles from Washington D.C. A war of attrition and guerrilla warfare was never a realistic option and led to the South adopting their offensive-defensive tactic aiming to quickly break Northern morale or bring Britain into the war.

Although the idea that the war was inevitably a lost cause for the Confederacy is widely criticised, I believe that in the right context with the correct supporting evidence that the Lost Cause concept is entirely realistic.

Own source 4

Grant rejected the Lost Cause argument that the South had simply been overwhelmed by numbers. Grant argued, "This is the way public opinion was made during the war and this is the way history is made now. We never overwhelmed the South ... What we won from the South we won by hard fighting."

Ulysses S. Grant, speaking in an 1878 interview, discussing the theory of the Lost Cause.

Many people have opposed the Lost Cause, claiming it to simply be a myth dreamt up by 'public opinion' in the wounded Southern nation. Ulysses Grant, commonly portrayed as an alcoholic and an unskilled butcher of the Union army, blatantly stands against the idea that the war as a lost cause. Grant states that the North never truly overwhelmed the South but instead won after years of hard fighting.

Grant's quote comes a year after his second term in office which was plagued by scandal leading to criticism of Grant. Along with his portrayal by the South during the war I believe Grant's statement is fuelled by his dissatisfaction of his depiction, allowing room for bias in his statement. The condemnation of Grant's time as a general and in office would have impacted greatly on Grant as the public agreed with the Lost Cause theory. It would make sense that Grant would wish to express his feelings against the Lost Cause school of thought after the great efforts he went through to secure victory for the Union.

This source shows the slow movement of opinion away from the Lost Cause school, towards the Progressive school of thought, where historians focused less on the idea that the war was an inevitable defeat for the South and searched for other factors. The First and Second World Wars, fought during the progressive period, caused many historians to focus on the battle-front as Grant does in this source.



Many people in the North held this view on the Southern version of the war but chose not to argue against it in order to maintain peace with the rehabilitated South.

When evaluating the cause of the Southern defeat, a major factor that must be accounted for is the political leadership of the two nations. The differences between Lincoln and Jefferson Davis's abilities have often been compared by historians. This is reflected in source 5, an extract from an interview with James McPherson, a seminal American Civil War historian.



Own source 5

Resources were a necessary condition for Union victory, it is not a sufficient explanation for that victory. Neither are the internal divisions within the Confederacy sufficient explanation for its defeat, because the North also suffered sharp internal divisions between those who supported a war for the abolition of slavery and those who resisted it, between Republicans and Democrats, between Unionists and Copperheads. And, in fact, the North probably suffered from greater internal disunity than the Confederacy.

Superior leadership is a possible explanation for Union victory. Abraham Lincoln was probably a better war president than Jefferson Davis and certainly offered a better explanation to his own people of what they were fighting for than Davis was able to offer. By the latter half of the war, Northern military leadership had evolved a coherent strategy for victory which involved the destruction of Confederate armies but went beyond that to the destruction of Confederate resources to wage war, including the resource of slavery, the South's labor power. By the time Grant had become general-in-chief and Sherman his chief subordinate and Sheridan one of his hardest-hitting field commanders, the North had evolved a strategy that in the end completely destroyed the Confederacy's ability to wage war. And that combination of strategic leadership—both at the political level with Lincoln and the military level with Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—is what in the end explains Northern victory.

James M. McPherson, a professor of history at Princeton University, speaking in an interview with Carl Zebrowski about 'why the South lost the civil war?' (1999).


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My mother came for us at the end of the year 1865, and demanded that her children be given up to her. This, mistress refused to do, and threatened to set the dogs on my mother if she did not at once leave the place. My mother went away, and remained with some of the neighbors until supper time. Then she got a boy to tell Caroline to come down to the fence. When she came, my mother told her to go back and get Henry and myself and bring us down to the gap in the fence as quick as she could. Then my mother took Henry in her arms, and my sister carried me on her back. We climbed fences and crossed fields, and after several hours came to a little hut which my mother had secured on a plantation. We had no more than reached the place, and made a little fire, when master's two sons rode up and demanded that the children be returned. My mother refused to give us up. Upon her offering to go with them to the Yankee headquarters to find out if it were really true that all negroes had been made free, the young men left, and troubled us no more.

The mother of Annie L. Burton ran away during the Civil War. She returned afterwards to claim her slave children. She recorded the incident in her book, *Memories of Childhood's Slavery Days* (1909).

Throughout the first half of the 19th century, it was a common occurrence for slaves to run away from their masters through the Underground Railroad. During the war many slaves

saw their chance to escape captivity; source 8 comes from a runaway slave's memoirs. The influence of the Union forces being in the South gave slaves greater confidence at escaping.

This source may not be reliable as it holds the risk of being biased because the author may have elaborated her story for financial gain. As a young child Annie Burton's memory of the event may not be a true representation of what actually happened because her recollection forty years later would be selective. Furthermore, the highly emotive nature of the source brings into question its validity because the obvious trauma experienced.

Burton's memoirs were written in the progressive period. Progressive historians used such information to highlight the internal race conflict in Southern society as the reason for the Confederate loss. Moreover, progressive historians wrote in a period where progressive reformation of the USA was needed and extracts such as source 8 were used to understand the dynamics of American society.



A slave uprising caused fear in the South but runaway slaves also damaged the Confederacy's war effort by removing Southern workers who were necessary in producing the food and cotton used to clothe and feed the rebel forces.

The 14th amendment and the effect of runaway slaves was an important cause of the Southern defeat. The Southern fear of a slave uprising limited the use of armed slaves on the war-front, as many Southerners were apprehensive of giving their slaves weapons. This impact must not, however, be overestimated. I believe little would have changed regarding the outcome of the war as the majority of slaves remained in captivity.

The fact that the North had almost three times as many black men serving in the army than the Confederacy, even though forty percent of the population of the South were slaves shows the inability of the Southern Government to truly mobilise all the resources at their disposal. It also shows the emotional willingness of black Americans to volunteer for the North.


Although the Southern defeat cannot be put directly down to any one factor, I believe that the War was always a lost cause for the Confederate States. As shown in my sources, the impact of leaders on the battlefield and in Government greatly influenced the outcome of the war, especially the short-comings of Jefferson Davis in maintaining morale on the home-front and maximising the output of the South for the War effort. This greatly hindered the ability of the South to win the War. Similarly, mistakes from Robert Lee and his high casualty tactics in the first half of the war was a turning point as the South no longer had the soldiers to fight an offensive-defensive war. Black people played a fairly important role in the War and Jefferson Davis' inability at mobilising this great workforce for the military may well have been a major cause for Southern defeat.


I believe the War was a lost cause, not in the traditional, romanticised sense of the Lost Cause theory, but in a more realistic sense. I believe the traditional Southern lost cause school of thought is, in fact, quite damaging to a historical view of the American Civil War. It leads to the common disregarding of the realistic aspects of the Lost Cause argument as it is easy to group lost cause theories together and criticise them as one amalgamation.

In my opinion the Lost Cause argument does not need to be exaggerated or distorted by Southern pride. The simple fact that the South stood alone during the Civil War, unlike the examples used by lost cause critics, shows the major reason the South would inevitably lose the War. Without aid from a powerful nation, the internal markets of the Confederacy would certainly collapse; this caused inflation, loss of public morale which in turn saw many soldiers returning home. Without an ally in Europe to support them I believe the South had no chance of winning the war.

Similarly, I believe public opinion in the North would never be strong enough to see the Union choose peace over seeing out the War. The Confederacy bordered the Union; they could not win as they did not have the strength to occupy the Union, and the fact it was a part of the Union meant the public were generally inclined to believe it was their right to retake the South. Overall, I believe the South could never have won the war without foreign intervention and aid, and thus the Civil War was a lost cause from the start.



Marks awarded by moderator: 

Suggestions for improvement made by the moderator: 

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'The demands of the sans-culottes were the main cause of the Terror'. How valid is this assessment of the role played by the sans-culottes in the development of the Terror?

The quest for liberty, pioneered by members of the bourgeoisie, had never more been under threat than in the pivotal two years of the Terror. The masses had rallied, an unstoppable force striking fear into the hearts of their enemies both at home and abroad and thrusting their demands upon an already strained government. However, there is some speculation as to whether the sans-culottes, newly politicised with radical views such as popular democracy and equality were the main cause of the outbreak of the Terror. Sceptics argue that the outbreak of war in 1792, the fear of counter-revolution and the depreciation of the assignat were equally important, if not of greater importance. No doubt the Terror was a period of paranoia, brutality and ruthlessness, but the idea that the demands of the sans-culottes were the main cause of the Terror is debatable. Were they a political force terrorising the elite? Or were they just workers enthused by the political events of the time?

In the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, historians developed what became the Grand Tradition, interpreting the revolution and the Terror as essentially a positive experience. The development of this 'Grand Tradition', formed the basis of Marxist historiography. Introduced by Mathiez, the Marxist historical doctrine mixed history with the political ideas of socialists such as Jean Jaures. The dialectic nature of these Marxist arguments ensured that no serious challenge was posed until mid-way through the twentieth century. Marxists centre the revolution around a class struggle, originally between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie and in the latter stages between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Marxists argue the Committee for Public Safety (CPS), unofficially headed by Robespierre, attempted to appease the urban workers with multiple concessions, effectively making their aims one of the main causes of the Terror. A historiography championed by historians such as Lefebvre and Soboul, the Marxist interpretation examines the revolution's impact on the average individual. This form of historical analysis is often seen as history 'from below' and focusses on the revolution being a social revolution.

Without the Parisian sans-culotterie, the bourgeoisie could not have triumphed in so radical a fashion. From 1789 to the Year II, the sans-culottes were used as an effective weapon of revolutionary combat and national defence. In 1793 the popular movement made possible the installation of the Revolutionary Government and consequently the defeat of the counter-revolution in France and the allied coalition in Europe. The success of the popular movement during the summer of 1793 led to the organisation of the Terror which struck such an irreparable blow to the old social order. In Year II, the shopkeeper and craftsman element of the sans-culotterie became the most effective weapon in the struggle for the destruction of outmoded methods of production and the social relationships founded upon them.

[Albert Soboul, a French Marxist historian and leading authority on the role of the sans-culottes, writing in *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French revolution* (1964)]

The source is from Soboul, a recognised academic specialising in the French Revolution, meaning there is little doubt about the reliability of the source as his book would have been well researched. Soboul believed the underlying factor of the Revolution was the class struggle between the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and proletariat. He argued that the revolution would not have reached the height of the Terror without the unwavering support of the of the sans-culottes, whom he considers to be a social class vital to the progression of the revolution, in effect a form of proto-proletariat. Soboul's work suggests that the CPS, backed by an influential group, the sans-culotte, were justified for their actions during the Terror. In order to respond to the threat of foreign aggression and the internal threat of the counter-revolution, the measures taken by the CPS were essential for the security of France. This is backed up by Paul Hansen who argues 'The Terror was not inherent in the ideology of the revolution, but the circumstances made it necessary.'

Many of Soboul's standpoints regarding the revolution are undoubtedly influenced by his Communist beliefs in his private life. A committed member of the French Communist Party, Soboul attempted to link his Marxist beliefs to the revolution, and was therefore enticed by the ideas of Albert Mathiez, another Communist, who emphasised the importance of class conflict. In fact Mathiez was very influential in the creation of the Marxist interpretation, leaving lasting impressions on both Soboul and Lefebvre. Despite this political affiliation, Soboul always denied belonging to the Marxist school of thought, instead insisting he belonged to the 'classical' or 'scientific' school of thought represented by De Toqueville.

Soboul argued that the sans-culottes were a politically active, organised social movement who aimed to secure policies beneficial to the non-bourgeois element of the third estate. Soboul claims they were proved to be a very useful tool for those in positions of power when it came to enforcing their ideologies. Much of their power and significance came from the Parisian Sections where they laid out their demands such as in the following address:

Mandatories of the people - Just how long are you going to tolerate royalism, ambition, egotism, intrigue and avarice, each of them linked to fanaticism, and opening our frontiers to tyranny, whilst spreading devastation and death everywhere? How long are you going to suffer food-hoarders spreading famine throughout the Republic in the detestable hope that patriots will cut each others throats and the throne will be restored over our bloody corpses, with all the help of foreign despots? You must hurry, representatives of the people to deprive all former nobles, priests, parlementaires and financiers of all administrative and judicial responsibility; also to fix the price of basic foodstuffs, raw materials, wages and the profits of industry and commerce.

Consequently the general assembly of the Section des Sans Culottes considers it to be the duty of all citizens to propose measures which seem likely to bring about a return of abundance and public tranquility. It therefore resolves to ask the Convention to decree the following:

That former nobles will be barred from military careers and every kind of public office; that former parlementaires, priests and financiers will be deprived of all administrative and judicial duties.

That the price of basic necessities be fixed at the levels of 1789-90 allowing for differences in quality.

That the price of raw materials, levels of wages and profits of industry and commerce also be fixed, so that the hardworking men, the cultivator and the trader will also procure basic necessities and also those things which add to their enjoyment.

That all those cultivators who, by some accident have not been able to harvest their crop be compensated from public funds.

That each department be allowed sufficient public money to ensure that the price of basic foodstuffs will be the same for all citizens of the Republic.

That the sums of money allowed to departments be used to eradicate variations in the price of transporting them to all parts of the Republic, so that each citizen is equal in these things.

That existing leases be cancelled and rents fixed at the levels of 1789-90, as for foodstuffs.

That there be a fixed maximum on personal wealth.

That no single individual shall possess more than the declared maximum.

That nobody be able to lease more land than is necessary for a fixed number of ploughs.

That no citizen shall possess more than one workshop or retail shop.

That all who possess goods and land without legal title be recognised as proprietors.

The Section des sans Culottes thinks that these measures will create abundance and tranquility, and will, little by little remove the gross inequalities of wealth and multiply the number of proprietors

[Taken from an address to the Convention by the Section des Sans Culottes (2 September 1793)] Source Pack

This address to the Convention by the Section des Sans Culottes supports Sobouls assertion that the sans-culottes were a significant force within the French Revolution, as their Parisian Sections had enough influence to address and attempt to persuade members of the National Convention. Their demands such as a general maximum on wealth, fixed prices on raw materials and fixed food prices must have had some consideration from the Convention as many of the decrees they asked of the Convention were passed in the following year. It is a useful speech for historians as it underlines the demands of the sans-culotte, allowing them to understand the motives of the ordinary people in response to the revolution. The source highlights the sans-culottes dislike for those in positions of greater prosperity than their own. Also, the fact they can make demands to the National Convention gives them political clout, a direct contradiction to Cobban's

accusation that 'the san-culottes have been used almost literally as a red-herring to divert attention from the basic social problems'. This view expressed by Cobban is refuted by most Marxist historians. However, although disagreeing with Cobban's historical philosophy, some Marxist historians, such as Cobb, insist that san-culotteism was just a minor branch of Jacobinism, under the influence, and in awe of their Jacobin allies. This suggests that their demands were not their own, instead the demands of their Jacobin counterparts, linking back to the first source which calls the sans-culottes an 'effective weapon'. Also worthy of note is that the source is taken from the months directly preceding the Terror giving impetus to the idea this speech is a precursor to the outbreak of the Terror.

It seems as if the measures the sans-culotte and their far left compatriots such as Jacques Roux and the Enrages believe will bring about 'public tranquility', are underlying reasons why the Terror was needed: that is, to exercise the demands thrust upon the government. This subsequently could suggest the demands of the sans-culotte were a significant, if not the main, cause of the Terror.

Roux felt so strongly about achieving public tranquility that he felt the urge to highlight the necessity of equality, arguing otherwise freedom cannot be attained.

'Freedom is but an empty illusion when one class of men can starve another with impunity. Equality is but an empty illusion when the rich, through monopolies, have the decision of life or death over their own kind. The Republic is but an empty illusion when the counterrevolution takes place daily because three-quarters of the citizenry cannot afford the price of basic foodstuffs and no one sheds a tear.

Stopping trade which is nothing short of highway robbery must be clearly distinguished from simple commerce. It will only be by placing the cost of food within reach of the sans-culottes that you will win them over to Revolution and its constitutional laws.'

[Speech given to the Convention by Jacques Roux on the 25th June 1793] Additional Source

Jacques Roux was a revolutionary who argued that the ordinary poor people in revolutionary French society were being mistreated by the bourgeoisie. Roux demanded the government end this mistreatment and advocated the betterment of the sans-culottes and others who he felt were exploited. His radical views led him to become the figurehead of a far left group, the 'Enrages'. In this speech, performed during the early stages of the Terror, Roux asserts the economic demands of the Enrages, including more measures against the rich (whom he believes exploit the lower classes) and hoarders, who by keeping their food caused food shortages in major cities and urban areas such as Paris. He argued hoarders had no legitimate justification for depriving the patriots for whom he spoke. This links with the Marxist belief, postulated by Lefebvre, that the betterment of the every day people was a prime reason for the Terror. Roux even argues that the counter-revolution isn't surprising when you consider that the price of food is out of reach for three quarters of the citizenry, which would suggest that if the demands of the sans-culotte were met, through the Terror, the counter-revolution would be nullified because their grievances would be appeased. The majority of revisionist historians, however, discredit Roux's reasons for the development of the Terror, instead arguing that the demands of the sans-culotte were influenced by the decline of the assignat and the economic problems already surrounding the revolution. This is a speech to the Convention, so we must appreciate Roux is trying to persuade the deputies to support the demands of the Enrages and thus there could be a narrow-mindedness to his claims. However, the source is useful as it highlights the political concerns of those on the far left. One interesting observation is the frequency these populist speeches (both this and the last source) were coming in, undoubtedly having some effect on the Convention and influencing the legislation which they passed. This is evident when the Convention made hoarding food a capital threat, under immense pressure from the radical left wing elements of the convention, suggesting the demands of the sans-culotte were, in fact, becoming policy.

Some Marxist historians such as Rude, believed that the implementation of policy favoured by the sans-culotte was meant to appease them and confirm their support despite the repudiation of the Constitution of 1793.

But to realise their aims France's new rulers were compelled far more by the logic and pressure of events than by the teachings of the philosophes, to abandon the haphazard methods of government accepted by their predecessors, and Robespierre's conception of a government of 'a single will' hastily sketched in June, began to take shape in the autumn. Its basis had already been laid by the exceptional measures adopted because of the crisis of March 1793, and others had followed in August and September. But it was one thing to call the nation to arm and to threaten hoarders and speculators with summary justice; to direct the whole operation by what has commonly been called a 'Reign of Terror' was quite another. The matter was urgent as during the autumn months, administrative anarchy prevailed in a number of departments as local committees armées révolutionnaires (several raised without authority from Paris) and powerful 'pro-consuls' like Fouché Tallien and Carrier, armed with extraordinary powers to suppress rebellion, tended to interpret and

apply the law after their own fashion. So the needs of war, civil peace and public order—quite apart from any personal considerations—combined to persuade Robespierre and his associates to take further steps to strengthen their control in Paris. Such measures, to be effective, could hardly fail to flout the liberal-democratic provisions of the Constitution of June 1793. On declaring that 'the provisional government of France is revolutionary until the peace'. Thus the exceptional measures adopted before were given a greater degree of permanence and the constitution of 1793 was for the time being at least, suspended. But to conclude from this, as many critics have done, that this was intended all along and that 'revolutionary' government corresponded to the long-cherished ambitions of the Jacobin leaders is to misrepresent both their principles and the evolution of their policies. We have no means of knowing whether they ever sincerely hoped to restore the constitution once the war was over; we do know that it was not they but their successors who finally buried it and proscribed its defenders.

[Extract from George Rude's book 'The French Revolution' Pages 100-1 Marxist historian] Additional Source

This source is from an academic textbook written by George Rude in 1991. As with the other historians, their academic credentials increase the reliability of the source as it is meant to increase public understanding of the subject. Rude argues that although the Jacobin government gave way to some of the demands of the sans-culottes, rather than this being the cause of the Terror, it was a compensation package resulting from the Terror. The sans-culottes beloved constitution of 1793 was discarded and thus, to keep the masses on side, the government needed to compromise with the purpose of the Terror. Rude places emphasis on the importance of the *armée-révolutionnaire* and their leaders, believing they are a core reason for the pre-eminence of the Terror and argues the power they were given highlights why it was a reign of Terror. Effectively, he believes if it had just been clamping down on hoarders it would not constitute a reign of Terror, but the excessive force and brutality used by those tackling the counter-revolution means it was worthy of the title.

It is possible Rude came to these views because of his staunch communist beliefs, which propose a worker dominated state and society, something the sans-culotte epitomise. Also, he was mentored by Lefebvre meaning Lefebvre could have had some direct influence of his views moulding him to be of a similar school of thought as Lefebvre himself. Despite this, Eric Hobsbawm acclaims Rude as being one of the few historians with an objective approach, suggesting he was able to look outside the confines of his political ideology and look at the effects of the Revolution as a whole. Friguglietti, however, argues that Rude's work was unreliable and therefore not as useful as fellow historians work as it 'displayed sympathy for the lower classes, whether labourers or convicted criminals'.

In conclusion Rude believed that the simultaneous needs of 'war, civil peace and public order' were the driving force behind Robespierre's measures, not any personal service to a section of society. In fact, Rude was a big admirer of Robespierre, so much so that he wrote a biography titled *Robespierre: Portrait of a Revolutionary Democrat*, in which he argues Robespierre adapted well to the circumstances thrust upon revolutionary government.

It has been said that Terror was the mainspring of despotic government. Does your government, then, resemble a despotism? Yes, as the sword which glitters in the hands of liberty's heroes resembles the one with which tyranny's lackeys are armed. Let the despot govern his brutalized subjects by terror; he is right to do this, as a despot. Subdue liberty's enemies by terror, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny. Is force made only to protect crime? And is it not to strike the heads of the proud that lightning is destined?

Nature imposes upon every physical and moral being the law of providing for its own preservation. Crime slaughters innocence in order to reign, and innocence in the hands of crime fights with all its strength.

Let tyranny reign for a single day, and on the morrow not one patriot will be left. How long will the despots' fury be called justice, and the people's justice barbarism or rebellion? How tender one is to the oppressors and how inexorable against the oppressed! And how natural whoever has no hatred for crime cannot love virtue. . . .

Social protection is due only to peaceful citizens; there are no citizens in the Republic but the republicans. The royalists, the conspirators are, in its eyes, only strangers or, rather, enemies. Is not the terrible war, which liberty sustains against tyranny, indivisible? Are not the enemies within the allies of those without? The murderers who tear our country apart internally; the intriguers who purchase the consciences of the people's agents; the traitors who sell them; the mercenary libelers subsidized to dishonor the popular cause, to kill public virtue, to stir up the fires of civil discord, and to prepare political counterrevolution by means of moral counterrevolution—are all these men less to blame or less dangerous than the tyrants whom they serve? All those who interpose their parricidal gentleness to protect the wicked from the avenging blade of national justice are like those who would

throw themselves between the tyrants' henchmen and our soldiers' bayonets. All the outbursts of their false sensitivity seem to me only longing sighs for England and Austria. Aristocracy defends itself better by its intrigues than patriotism does by its services. Some people would like to govern revolutions by the quibbles of the law courts and treat conspiracies against the Republic like legal proceedings against private persons. Tyranny kills; liberty argues. And the code made by the conspirators themselves is the law by which they are judged.

[Robespierre on Political Morality] Additional Source

In this speech written to justify the Terror to the National Assembly, Robespierre seems to concur with the position that the main aim of the Terror was to rid the country of the counter-revolution, rather than to give in to the imposition of demands from the sans-culotte. Although this may seem a revelation, in reality it should be expected as no government, claiming to champion liberty, would openly admit to advocating the policies of a faction, for fear of being called tyrannical and undemocratic. Robespierre argues that the counter-revolutionaries must be found out, as any enemy of the republic is a friend of the foreign powers trying to impose themselves onto France. As this is a speech to the Convention, he is attempting to secure the deputies support for his ideology. This gives the source usefulness and relevance as it shows the direction the figurehead of the CPS would like the revolution to take and his reasons for it. Robespierre thrusting the importance of rooting out counter-revolutionaries isn't a first. In the early years of the revolution he was the only Jacobin leader who opposed war with the imperial powers, instead arguing that the counter-revolution inside France was far more dangerous. Many Marxist historians argue that the sans-culotte were more influential in policy creation than Robespierre admits and highlight that other members in the CPS were more sympathetic to the demands of the sans-culotte, and therefore more engaged in socially appeasing them than Robespierre. On the opposing side revisionists argue that as the leading figure, Robespierre, doesn't see the Terror as an appeasement of the urban labourer it cannot be seen as one, putting forward the idea that many of the concessions to the proletariat were meant to keep spirits high amongst the armee-revolutionnaire, so the armee-revolutionnaire would do more to stop counter-revolutionary activity. This leads to the conclusion reached by many Revisionists and Marxists alike that the Jacobins manipulated the sans-culottes to use them for their own means.

The first challenge to the domination of Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution came from British Historian Alfred Cobban. Cobban aims to challenge with his 'social interpretation' as he thought the Marxist view was ideologically driven and placed too much emphasis on class conflict. Also, Cobban was writing during the Cold War when there was a distrust of all things Marxist in the western world. To counter he put forth arguments suggesting that there was no social revolution, only a political revolution exacerbated by the outbreak of war and the need for national unity. Furthermore, revisionists actively try to dissuade the romanticised view of the sans-culottes, generally depicting them in a more savage self-serving light trying to twist the revolution to their own means. They do ultimately feel, however, that the sans-culottes had a relatively minimal impact in the outbreak and development of the Terror. In recent times revisionism has arguably become the more credible interpretation and is generally championed by those on the political right. One of the prominent revisionists in the modern era is Simon Schama.

The commune's leaders did, however, turn the opportunity to their advantage. Chaumette got on a table in the general council to declare that "we now have open war between the rich and the poor" and urged the immediate mobilization of the army revolutionnaire to go into the countryside, uncover the machinations of the malveillants and the riches egoistes, liberate food from their clutches and deliver them to republican punishment. For good measure Herbert added that each battalion should be accompanied by a mobile guillotine. This demand, he said, should be taken to the Convention the following day. Since the commune had also ordered the closure of workshops, it guaranteed that a large turnout would, as on May 31, surround the Convention. And while Robespierre in particular did not care to share his bench with the 'people' he rhetorically embraced from the tribune, the day should not be read as the imposition of sans-culottism on a reluctant and frightened Convention. In fact the occasion was dominated not by the economic crisis but by the shattering news that Toulon had opened the harbour and city to the British fleet commanded by Admiral Hood. This created the atmosphere of patriotic emergency in which Danton and Barere thrived. It was no hard thing, then, to decree that "terror will be the order of the day," since the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety had a shrewd idea that they would be its executors. As enacted on September 5, the armee revolutionnaire was also a long way from being the mass squadrons of republican vengeance. Instead of the great sans-culotte army of a hundred thousand envisaged in the earliest petitions, or the thirty thousand demanded by the Commune, the Convention authorized a force of just six thousand infantrymen and twelve hundred cavalry to operate in the Paris region... It was also, deprived of the kind of summary punitive powers Herbert had anticipated. For the Jacobins it was less a matter of launching a republican mission than exporting some of the most troublesome militants to the countryside and applying force to the crucial issue of food supply for the capital, thus disburdening themselves of two of their most intractable problems at the same time.

(Simon Schama, Revisionist historian in his Book 'Citizens') Additional Source

Simon Schama is a revisionist historian. As a historian he is trying to uncover the truth, meaning he will generally be reliable as he is serving academia. Be that as it may, Schama's style, which is similar to Carlyle's in 'The French Revolution: A History', may exaggerate claims for emphasis as the book is written like a novel to be accessible to the average reader. Nonetheless, the usefulness of the source cannot be understated as Schama argues that the 'imposition of sans-culottism' only has minor relevance in the development of the Terror instead placing greater importance on the threat posed by the foreign powers France was fighting. Effectively, like many revisionists before him, he argues circumstance drove the Terror, that it was no 'republic of virtue' rather a defensive wall against the oncoming tides of counter-revolution and foreign war. Interestingly, unlike other revisionist historians, Schama doesn't downplay the effect of the sans-culotte, claiming the insurrectionary feeling amongst the working class Parisians was "not the unfortunate by-product of revolution but the source of its energy". This difference to other revisionists can be explained by Schama's political beliefs, putting himself on the 'European left' as opposed to the centre-right attitude held by most revisionist historians. In spite of this, he puts forward suggestions arguing the demands of the sans-culottes failed, that the *armee revolutionnaire* was insignificant in comparison to the size suggested by the earliest popular movements and proposing that instead of being a powerful revolutionary force, they were just a mismatch of troublemakers who the CPS and Revolutionary government wanted to use, continuing with the belief that the sans-culotte were manipulated by the Jacobins to suit Jacobin interests. Furthermore, Schama agrees in principle with Furet, arguing that many historians on the far left of the political spectrum don't necessarily provide objective versions of the revolution, as they are naturally drawn to the ideology behind the revolution and thus, wish to present it in an appealing, positive light.

Overall, it seems Schama recognises the sans-culotte as a potential threat, but refutes the claim they are the main reason for the Terror. Instead placing emphasis on the wars, both internal and external, claiming that the Terror was needed to secure France's safety. Schama argues this war against the counter-revolutionaries and their foreign proponents forced the government to incarcerate those supporting counter-revolution. However prisons soon became overcrowded, so the CPS, showing their ability to adapt to changing circumstances created a Revolutionary Tribunal. One man successful at utilising such an institution was Jean-Baptiste Carrier, one of the most famous representatives on mission.

Dear friend and colleague,

I have just put a letter in the last post to the national convention, detailing the great reforms I have made in Rennes. The most successful measure has been the confiscation of the property of Chapelier, Defermon, Lanjuinais, and of all the counter revolutionaries, and ex-administrators who had tried to escape

...On the day when the latter were dismissed, I read out a list of their crimes to them, as loudly and vehemently as I could, in the presence of the people of Rennes whose shouts of righteous indignation testified to the truth of my accusations. Although they admitted to the charges, they asked me today what their crimes were; they demanded an interrogation and to be given a hearing and judgement. I replied with calm and manly firmness that the great amount of evidence against them, as well as the law relating to suspects, not only made the measures I had taken against them legitimate but actually obligatory. [I also told them] that I was not a judge with the power to interrogate them and give them a hearing, but that if they persisted in demanding a trial, I would give orders for them to be sent to the Revolutionary Tribunal which alone has the power to deal with the crimes of federalism and conspiracy, of which they stood accused. 'Oh but...' they replied...They were then completely silent.

Everywhere the number of salutary arrests is increasing daily. At Saint-Brieuc, at Plouer, at Saint-Servan, at Redon, at Vitre, at Fougères, counter revolutionaries and suspects are being arrested every day. I will send them immediately to the Revolutionary Tribunal. At the same time, I intend in the near future to make up some cargoes of unsworn priests and to intrust them to a sailor from Saint-Servan known for his patriotism.

Farewell, my good friend. My work has caused a remarkable change in my health. I was very ill yesterday. If it were not for being laid low, I would have hastened to Nantes, the source of counter-revolution and a continuous source of energy for the Vendée, where my colleagues have let two popular clubs stay open, one of which is composed entirely of real counter-revolutionaries. It is because of half-measures and a really blameful leniency that we have experienced the recent defeats outside Nantes, which will become a second Lyon if we are not careful.

Greetings, fraternity.

Carrier.

[A letter from Carrier to De Sechelles at the height of the Terror] Additional Source

Carrier's letter tows the line with the revisionist belief, that the counter-revolution was one of the prime reasons for the development of the Terror. Carrier uses the threat of the creation of a 'second Lyon' to justify his extreme methods when dealing with the counter-revolutionaries in Nantes. It's likely the CPS deemed the destruction of the counter-revolutionaries of high importance as they allowed Carrier's sadistic methods to go on for so long (although he was recalled after the mass-drowning of civilians). Jean-Baptiste Carrier was notorious during the revolution for being a vicious and barbaric representative on mission. As he is a representative on mission the source is useful as he carried out the Terror so had a first hand experience. This is a personal letter to his friend so it is likely he believed its content, although he could have exaggerated the threat so it appeared he was doing a better job as he wished to gain favour with the CPS (which De Sechelles was a member of). This could lead to the questioning of reliability as he may have meddled with the truth. Carrier was also influential in the creation of a Revolutionary Tribunal, a mechanism used by the government to assert their dominance and put fear into the hearts of the counter-revolutionaries. This again fits in with the Revisionist belief, held by David Andress who argues "The descent into Terror was not brought about by ruthless leaders striking out at helpless victims, but by men who feared their own immolation driven... by the real threat of aristocratic vengeance".

Critics of this view argue that, if the aim of the Terror was to disperse the counter-revolutionaries, why include an economic Terror as well, why not focus your efforts on the Revolutionary Tribunal? There would be no need for the economic Terror unless there was another cause of the Terror. Therefore the *armee-revolutionnaire* must have had some other motives, as highlighted by the next source.

The Citizen soldiers of the Revolutionary Army still imbued with revolutionary principles, are now stationed at Pontoise and assure you that they have only left Paris and their homes to thwart Intrigue and Aristocracy to the utmost. From the moment we arrived here, we have been occupied in arranging the provisioning of Paris. Several of our comrades, in the course of their duties, have found eggs and butter hidden in cupboards in farmhouses and even grain hidden in barrels.

The very mention of our name makes traitors go pale. For more than three months we have demanded the authority to exercise full surveillance. Our demands have been in vain. Our brother citizens lack everything, and if we do not have sufficient food, it is because the scarcity is only apparent. We ask that we might search households, which we have not done so far, at least only feebly. We ask that the Revolutionary Commissioners send us a true *Sans Culotte*, authorised to override the authority of the local commune. By such means we shall foil the counter-revolutionaries who go unto the countryside and buy up the foodstuffs in order to sell them to the rich and selfish at inflated prices.

We ask that we may be allowed to requisition food and bring it to Paris. We made such a demand to the Commission for provisioning the Republic, but we have had no reply. Now calumny directs its steps towards us; That is why we ask you to give us the chance to prove that we are still Republicans and supporters of the Mountain. We are obliged to tell you that it is the incompetence of the municipal authorities that is the sole cause of the shortage of basic necessities

[From an appeal to the general assembly of the section of the Observatory by a detachment of the Parisian *armee revolutionnaire* (16 March 1794)] In Source Pack

This source, written near the end of the Terror, when the domestic atrocities committed by the government were at their peak, emphasises the demands of the *sans-culotte*; wanting to be able to 'requisition food' and 'exercise full surveillance'. However, they feel as if their demands are being ignored as for 'three months' they have asked to be able to exercise the surveillance and the Convention have not complied, suggesting that the appeasement of the *sans-culotte* was not the main priority of the Terror since had their demands been integral they would have been awarded as soon as the demand was made. Nonetheless, the letter is written by the *armee revolutionnaire*, whose mission is to catch hoarders, which is the fulfilment of an idea aimed at conciliating the *sans-culottes*. The source itself argues that the demands of the *sans-culotte* must be met so as to flush out the counter-revolutionaries, again putting the security of the republic ahead of their own personal demands. Even so, it's likely that many of the *armee revolutionnaire* thought that as soon as the internal and external wars were won, their demands would be met, having been under the illusion that their demands were the foundation of the republic. As Peter Mcphee states "The central purpose of the Terror was to institute the emergency and draconian measures necessary at the time of military crisis" and it just so happened that the *sans-culotte* were ideally placed to become a force used by the government, in return for empty promises they had no intention of fulfilling.

Some Marxist historians would argue that as victory and stability could not be assured without the compliance of the sans-culottes, making sure they knew they were vital to the republic was a priority so they would be willing to sacrifice for the republic. Therefore it can be argued the demands of the sans-culotte developed the Terror, but evidence suggests it's hard to say they caused the Terror. However, for the Terror to advance, the execution of their demands was necessary. Despite his Marxist background, Richard Cobb disagrees with this view, arguing the sans-culotte were insignificant.

The sans-culottes could afford to be noisily bellicose and demonstratively patriotic. They were mostly beyond military age and in little danger unless they belonged to skilled trades of use to national defence, of being sent way from home, much less to win the war, but from a distance. Unlike Jacobinism sans-culottisme was not outward-looking or exportable. The frontiers of sans-culottisme were often confined to a single commune and it was difficult to link up the efforts of even those in two neighbouring towns. It is not surprising that it did not have an international audience. Counter-revolutionary Europe made no distinction between sans-culottisme and Jacobinism. The Sans-culottes might never have existed

[Richard Cobb, a British academic historian and specialist on the French Revolutionary Period, writing in *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820* (1970)] Source Pack

Cobb, a leftwing historian who specialised on the French Revolution argued the sans-culotte were all show and no substance, that difficulty in unifying the sans-culotte hindered the strength of their demands as it left them unable to successfully coerce government into implementing their demands. This source is a direct contradiction to Sobouls belief, showing the spectrum of the debate regarding their significance. Cobb spent a substantial amount of time independently researching in the French archives meaning his views are reliable and useful. Cobb believes the development of the Terror was a result of the need to secure victory in both the internal and external wars rather than an appeasement of the urban labourers. Cobb also proposes that members of the CPS were trying to fulfill their political desires - using the Terror as an excuse to try and reach their political utopia. However, one should be sceptical about this belief as over time radicalism lost influence over the CPS. This loosening of grip by radicalism was so extreme that many far left factions were actually executed, leaving the sans-culotte without stable leadership or direction meaning their influence (if we assume they had any to start with) slowly ebbed away. Cobb also argues that if they even existed, the majority of the sans-culotte were filled with rhetoric as they were largely uninvolved in the conflict. Cobb proposes that sans-culottisme ideas varied from commune to commune, and so to put them all under an umbrella term vastly simplifies the differences of ideology within the sans-culotte.

In conclusion, it must be noted that the demands of the sans-culotte had some bearing on the course of the Terror and its development. But, it must be understood that their demands only really provided for an economic Terror with demands such as general maximum on personal wealth and capital punishment for hoarders. It must also be emphasised that the belief that their demands were the main cause of the Terror is narrowminded and in reality probably ideologically driven. It is at best a secondary cause used to win over the sans-culotte so that the armee-revolutionnaire (constituting of mainly sans-culottes) would fulfill their role with vigour in both the internal and external wars. If we follow the thought track of Furet and Cobban then even as a secondary domestic cause the scope of the sans-culotte was limited due to the decline of the assignat and the recovery of an economic slump must have been more important to the CPS than the appeasement of a section of society and thus the restrictions had to be imposed anyway to secure the wellbeing of the nation. The wars, internal and external, had merged with situations like the handing over of Toulon to the British and the support of the foreign powers to those in the Vendee and therefore the suppression of this dual threat was the main priority of the revolutionary government. The government were attempting to secure France's borders from the 'tyrants' who wanted to instill 'despotic governments' but logically, when conflict is on so many fronts it is important to secure the support of those already on your side. Thus minor appeasement is not only necessary but vital for the success of Revolutionary France. So, overall, the demands of the sans-culotte were not the main factor in the development of the Terror, but a coincidental byproduct of the government fulfilling their other aims.

3997 words

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'The demands of the sans-culottes were the main cause of the Terror'. How valid is this assessment of the role played by the sans-culottes in the development of the Terror?

The quest for liberty, pioneered by members of the bourgeoisie, had never more been under threat than in the pivotal two years of the Terror. The masses had rallied, an unstoppable force striking fear into the hearts of their enemies both at home and abroad and thrusting their demands upon an already strained government. However, there is some speculation as to whether the sans-culottes, newly politicised with radical views such as popular democracy and equality were the main cause of the outbreak of the Terror. Sceptics argue that the outbreak of war in 1792, the fear of counter-revolution and the depreciation of the assignat were equally important, if not of greater importance. No doubt the Terror was a period of paranoia, brutality and ruthlessness, but the idea that the demands of the sans-culottes were the main cause of the Terror is debatable. Were they a political force terrorising the elite? Or were they just workers enthused by the political events of the time?

In the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, historians developed what became the Grand Tradition, interpreting the revolution and the Terror as essentially a positive experience. The development of this 'Grand Tradition', formed the basis of Marxist historiography. Introduced by Mathiez, the Marxist historical doctrine mixed history with the political ideas of socialists such as Jean Jaures. The dialectic nature of these Marxist arguments ensured that no serious challenge was posed until mid-way through the twentieth century. Marxists centre the revolution around a class struggle, originally between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie and in the latter stages between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Marxists argue the Committee for Public Safety (CPS), unofficially headed by Robespierre, attempted to appease the urban workers with multiple concessions, effectively making their aims one of the main causes of the Terror. A historiography championed by historians such as Lefebvre and Soboul, the Marxist interpretation examines the revolution's impact on the average individual. This form of historical analysis is often seen as history 'from below' and focusses on the revolution being a social revolution.

Without the Parisian sans-culotterie, the bourgeoisie could not have triumphed in so radical a fashion. From 1789 to the Year II, the sans-culottes were used as an effective weapon of revolutionary combat and national defence. In 1793 the popular movement made possible the installation of the Revolutionary Government and consequently the defeat of the counter-revolution in France and the allied coalition in Europe. The success of the popular movement during the summer of 1793 led to the organisation of the Terror which struck such an irreparable blow to the old social order. In Year II, the shopkeeper and craftsman element of the sans-culotterie became the most effective weapon in the struggle for the destruction of outmoded methods of production and the social relationships founded upon them.

[Albert Soboul, a French Marxist historian and leading authority on the role of the sans-culottes, writing in *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French revolution* (1964)]

The source is from Soboul, a recognised academic specialising in the French Revolution, meaning there is little doubt about the reliability of the source as his book would have been well researched. Soboul believed the underlying factor of the Revolution was the class struggle between the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and proletariat. He argued that the revolution would not have reached the height of the Terror without the unwavering support of the of the sans-culottes, whom he considers to be a social class vital to the progression of the revolution, in effect a form of proto-proletariat. Soboul's work suggests that the CPS, backed by an influential group, the sans-culotte, were justified for their actions during the Terror. In order to respond to the threat of foreign aggression and the internal threat of the counter-revolution, the measures taken by the CPS were essential for the security of France. This is backed up by Paul Hansen who argues 'The Terror was not inherent in the ideology of the revolution, but the circumstances made it necessary.'

Many of Soboul's standpoints regarding the revolution are undoubtedly influenced by his Communist beliefs in his private life. A committed member of the French Communist Party, Soboul attempted to link his Marxist beliefs to the revolution, and was therefore enticed by the ideas of Albert Mathiez, another Communist, who emphasised the importance of class conflict. In fact Mathiez was very influential in the creation of the Marxist interpretation, leaving lasting impressions on both Soboul and Lefebvre. Despite this political affiliation, Soboul always denied belonging to the Marxist school of thought, instead insisting he belonged to the 'classical' or 'scientific' school of thought represented by De Toqueville.

Soboul argued that the sans-culottes were a politically active, organised social movement who aimed to secure policies beneficial to the non-bourgeois element of the third estate. Soboul claims they were proved to be a very useful tool for those in positions of power when it came to enforcing their ideologies. Much of their power and significance came from the Parisian Sections where they laid out their demands such as in the following address:

Mandatories of the people - Just how long are you going to tolerate royalism, ambition, egotism, intrigue and avarice, each of them linked to fanaticism, and opening our frontiers to tyranny, whilst spreading devastation and death everywhere? How long are you going to suffer food-hoarders spreading famine throughout the Republic in the detestable hope that patriots will cut each others throats and the throne will be restored over our bloody corpses, with all the help of foreign despots? You must hurry, representatives of the people to deprive all former nobles, priests, parlementaires and financiers of all administrative and judicial responsibility; also to fix the price of basic foodstuffs, raw materials, wages and the profits of industry and commerce.

Consequently the general assembly of the Section des Sans Culottes considers it to be the duty of all citizens to propose measures which seem likely to bring about a return of abundance and public tranquility. It therefore resolves to ask the Convention to decree the following:

That former nobles will be barred from military careers and every kind of public office; that former parlementaires, priests and financiers will be deprived of all administrative and judicial duties.

That the price of basic necessities be fixed at the levels of 1789-90 allowing for differences in quality.

That the price of raw materials, levels of wages and profits of industry and commerce also be fixed, so that the hardworking men, the cultivator and the trader will also procure basic necessities and also those things which add to their enjoyment.

That all those cultivators who, by some accident have not been able to harvest their crop be compensated from public funds.

That each department be allowed sufficient public money to ensure that the price of basic foodstuffs will be the same for all citizens of the Republic.

That the sums of money allowed to departments be used to eradicate variations in the price of transporting them to all parts of the Republic, so that each citizen is equal in these things.

That existing leases be cancelled and rents fixed at the levels of 1789-90, as for foodstuffs.

That there be a fixed maximum on personal wealth.

That no single individual shall possess more than the declared maximum.

That nobody be able to lease more land than is necessary for a fixed number of ploughs.

That no citizen shall possess more than one workshop or retail shop.

That all who possess goods and land without legal title be recognised as proprietors.

The Section des sans Culottes thinks that these measures will create abundance and tranquility, and will, little by little remove the gross inequalities of wealth and multiply the number of proprietors

[Taken from an address to the Convention by the Section des Sans Culottes (2 September 1793)] Source Pack



This address to the Convention by the Section des Sans Culottes supports Sobouls assertion that the sans-culottes were a significant force within the French Revolution, as their Parisian Sections had enough influence to address and attempt to persuade members of the National Convention. Their demands such as a general maximum on wealth, fixed prices on raw materials and fixed food prices must have had some consideration from the Convention as many of the decrees they asked of the Convention were passed in the following year. It is a useful speech for historians as it underlines the demands of the sans-culotte, allowing them to understand the motives of the ordinary people in response to the revolution. The source highlights the sans-culottes dislike for those in positions of greater prosperity than their own. Also, the fact they can make demands to the National Convention gives them political clout, a direct contradiction to Cobban's

accusation that 'the san-culottes have been used almost literally as a red-herring to divert attention from the basic social problems'. This view expressed by Cobban is refuted by most Marxist historians. However, although disagreeing with Cobban's historical philosophy, some Marxist historians, such as Cobb, insist that san-culotteism was just a minor branch of Jacobinism, under the influence, and in awe of their Jacobin allies. This suggests that their demands were not their own, instead the demands of their Jacobin counterparts, linking back to the first source which calls the sans-culottes an 'effective weapon'. Also worthy of note is that the source is taken from the months directly preceding the Terror giving impetus to the idea this speech is a precursor to the outbreak of the Terror.

It seems as if the measures the sans-culotte and their far left compatriots such as Jacques Roux and the Enrages believe will bring about 'public tranquility', are underlying reasons why the Terror was needed: that is, to exercise the demands thrust upon the government. This subsequently could suggest the demands of the sans-culotte were a significant, if not the main, cause of the Terror.

Roux felt so strongly about achieving public tranquility that he felt the urge to highlight the necessity of equality, arguing otherwise freedom cannot be attained.

'Freedom is but an empty illusion when one class of men can starve another with impunity. Equality is but an empty illusion when the rich, through monopolies, have the decision of life or death over their own kind. The Republic is but an empty illusion when the counterrevolution takes place daily because three-quarters of the citizenry cannot afford the price of basic foodstuffs and no one sheds a tear.

Stopping trade which is nothing short of highway robbery must be clearly distinguished from simple commerce. It will only be by placing the cost of food within reach of the sans-culottes that you will win them over to Revolution and its constitutional laws.'

[Speech given to the Convention by Jacques Roux on the 25th June 1793] Additional Source



Jacques Roux was a revolutionary who argued that the ordinary poor people in revolutionary French society were being mistreated by the bourgeoisie. Roux demanded the government end this mistreatment and advocated the betterment of the sans-culottes and others who he felt were exploited. His radical views led him to become the figurehead of a far left group, the 'Enrages'. In this speech, performed during the early stages of the Terror, Roux asserts the economic demands of the Enrages, including more measures against the rich (whom he believes exploit the lower classes) and hoarders, who by keeping their food caused food shortages in major cities and urban areas such as Paris. He argued hoarders had no legitimate justification for depriving the patriots for whom he spoke. This links with the Marxist belief, postulated by Lefebvre, that the betterment of the every day people was a prime reason for the Terror. Roux even argues that the counter-revolution isn't surprising when you consider that the price of food is out of reach for three quarters of the citizenry, which would suggest that if the demands of the sans-culotte were met, through the Terror, the counter-revolution would be nullified because their grievances would be appeased. The majority of revisionist historians, however, discredit Roux's reasons for the development of the Terror, instead arguing that the demands of the sans-culotte were influenced by the decline of the assignat and the economic problems already surrounding the revolution. This is a speech to the Convention, so we must appreciate Roux is trying to persuade the deputies to support the demands of the Enrages and thus there could be a narrow-mindedness to his claims. However, the source is useful as it highlights the political concerns of those on the far left. One interesting observation is the frequency these populist speeches (both this and the last source) were coming in, undoubtedly having some effect on the Convention and influencing the legislation which they passed. This is evident when the Convention made hoarding food a capital threat, under immense pressure from the radical left wing elements of the convention, suggesting the demands of the sans-culotte were, in fact, becoming policy.

Some Marxist historians such as Rude, believed that the implementation of policy favoured by the sans-culotte was meant to appease them and confirm their support despite the repudiation of the Constitution of 1793.

But to realise their aims France's new rulers were compelled far more by the logic and pressure of events than by the teachings of the philosophes, to abandon the haphazard methods of government accepted by their predecessors, and Robespierre's conception of a government of 'a single will' hastily sketched in June, began to take shape in the autumn. Its basis had already been laid by the exceptional measures adopted because of the crisis of March 1793, and others had followed in August and September. But it was one thing to call the nation to arm and to threaten hoarders and speculators with summary justice; to direct the whole operation by what has commonly been called a 'Reign of Terror' was quite another. The matter was urgent as during the autumn months, administrative anarchy prevailed in a number of departments as local committees armées révolutionnaires (several raised without authority from Paris) and powerful 'pro-consuls' like Fouché Tallien and Carrier, armed with extraordinary powers to suppress rebellion, tended to interpret and

apply the law after their own fashion. So the needs of war, civil peace and public order—quite apart from any personal considerations—combined to persuade Robespierre and his associates to take further steps to strengthen their control in Paris. Such measures, to be effective, could hardly fail to flout the liberal-democratic provisions of the Constitution of June 1793. On declaring that 'the provisional government of France is revolutionary until the peace'. Thus the exceptional measures adopted before were given a greater degree of permanence and the constitution of 1793 was for the time being at least, suspended. But to conclude from this, as many critics have done, that this was intended all along and that 'revolutionary' government corresponded to the long-cherished ambitions of the Jacobin leaders is to misrepresent both their principles and the evolution of their policies. We have no means of knowing whether they ever sincerely hoped to restore the constitution once the war was over; we do know that it was not they but their successors who finally buried it and proscribed its defenders.

[Extract from George Rude's book 'The French Revolution' Pages 100-1 Marxist historian] Additional Source

This source is from an academic textbook written by George Rude in 1991. As with the other historians, their academic credentials increase the reliability of the source as it is meant to increase public understanding of the subject. Rude argues that although the Jacobin government gave way to some of the demands of the sans-culottes, rather than this being the cause of the Terror, it was a compensation package resulting from the Terror. The sans-culottes beloved constitution of 1793 was discarded and thus, to keep the masses on side, the government needed to compromise with the purpose of the Terror. Rude places emphasis on the importance of the *armée-révolutionnaire* and their leaders, believing they are a core reason for the pre-eminence of the Terror and argues the power they were given highlights why it was a reign of Terror. Effectively, he believes if it had just been clamping down on hoarders it would not constitute a reign of Terror, but the excessive force and brutality used by those tackling the counter-revolution means it was worthy of the title.

It is possible Rude came to these views because of his staunch communist beliefs, which propose a worker dominated state and society, something the sans-culotte epitomise. Also, he was mentored by Lefebvre meaning Lefebvre could have had some direct influence of his views moulding him to be of a similar school of thought as Lefebvre himself. Despite this, Eric Hobsbawm acclaims Rude as being one of the few historians with an objective approach, suggesting he was able to look outside the confines of his political ideology and look at the effects of the Revolution as a whole. Friguglietti, however, argues that Rude's work was unreliable and therefore not as useful as fellow historians work as it 'displayed sympathy for the lower classes, whether labourers or convicted criminals'.

In conclusion Rude believed that the simultaneous needs of 'war, civil peace and public order' were the driving force behind Robespierre's measures, not any personal service to a section of society. In fact, Rude was a big admirer of Robespierre, so much so that he wrote a biography titled *Robespierre: Portrait of a Revolutionary Democrat*, in which he argues Robespierre adapted well to the circumstances thrust upon revolutionary government.

It has been said that Terror was the mainspring of despotic government. Does your government, then, resemble a despotism? Yes, as the sword which glitters in the hands of liberty's heroes resembles the one with which tyranny's lackeys are armed. Let the despot govern his brutalized subjects by terror; he is right to do this, as a despot. Subdue liberty's enemies by terror, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny. Is force made only to protect crime? And is it not to strike the heads of the proud that lightning is destined?

Nature imposes upon every physical and moral being the law of providing for its own preservation. Crime slaughters innocence in order to reign, and innocence in the hands of crime fights with all its strength.

Let tyranny reign for a single day, and on the morrow not one patriot will be left. How long will the despots' fury be called justice, and the people's justice barbarism or rebellion? How tender one is to the oppressors and how inexorable against the oppressed! And how natural whoever has no hatred for crime cannot love virtue. . . .

Social protection is due only to peaceful citizens; there are no citizens in the Republic but the republicans. The royalists, the conspirators are, in its eyes, only strangers or, rather, enemies. Is not the terrible war, which liberty sustains against tyranny, indivisible? Are not the enemies within the allies of those without? The murderers who tear our country apart internally; the intriguers who purchase the consciences of the people's agents; the traitors who sell them; the mercenary libelers subsidized to dishonor the popular cause, to kill public virtue, to stir up the fires of civil discord, and to prepare political counterrevolution by means of moral counterrevolution—are all these men less to blame or less dangerous than the tyrants whom they serve? All those who interpose their parricidal gentleness to protect the wicked from the avenging blade of national justice are like those who would



throw themselves between the tyrants' henchmen and our soldiers' bayonets. All the outbursts of their false sensitivity seem to me only longing sighs for England and Austria. Aristocracy defends itself better by its intrigues than patriotism does by its services. Some people would like to govern revolutions by the quibbles of the law courts and treat conspiracies against the Republic like legal proceedings against private persons. Tyranny kills; liberty argues. And the code made by the conspirators themselves is the law by which they are judged.

[Robespierre on Political Morality] Additional Source

In this speech written to justify the Terror to the National Assembly, Robespierre seems to concur with the position that the main aim of the Terror was to rid the country of the counter-revolution, rather than to give in to the imposition of demands from the sans-culotte. Although this may seem a revelation, in reality it should be expected as no government, claiming to champion liberty, would openly admit to advocating the policies of a faction, for fear of being called tyrannical and undemocratic. Robespierre argues that the counter-revolutionaries must be found out, as any enemy of the republic is a friend of the foreign powers trying to impose themselves onto France. As this is a speech to the Convention, he is attempting to secure the deputies support for his ideology. This gives the source usefulness and relevance as it shows the direction the figurehead of the CPS would like the revolution to take and his reasons for it. Robespierre thrusting the importance of rooting out counter-revolutionaries isn't a first. In the early years of the revolution he was the only Jacobin leader who opposed war with the imperial powers, instead arguing that the counter-revolution inside France was far more dangerous. Many Marxist historians argue that the sans-culotte were more influential in policy creation than Robespierre admits and highlight that other members in the CPS were more sympathetic to the demands of the sans-culotte, and therefore more engaged in socially appeasing them than Robespierre. On the opposing side revisionists argue that as the leading figure, Robespierre, doesn't see the Terror as an appeasement of the urban labourer it cannot be seen as one, putting forward the idea that many of the concessions to the proletariat were meant to keep spirits high amongst the armee-revolutionnaire, so the armee-revolutionnaire would do more to stop counter-revolutionary activity. This leads to the conclusion reached by many Revisionists and Marxists alike that the Jacobins manipulated the sans-culottes to use them for their own means.



The first challenge to the domination of Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution came from British Historian Alfred Cobban. Cobban aims to challenge with his 'social interpretation' as he thought the Marxist view was ideologically driven and placed too much emphasis on class conflict. Also, Cobban was writing during the Cold War when there was a distrust of all things Marxist in the western world. To counter he put forth arguments suggesting that there was no social revolution, only a political revolution exacerbated by the outbreak of war and the need for national unity. Furthermore, revisionists actively try to dissuade the romanticised view of the sans-culottes, generally depicting them in a more savage self-serving light trying to twist the revolution to their own means. They do ultimately feel, however, that the sans-culottes had a relatively minimal impact in the outbreak and development of the Terror. In recent times revisionism has arguably become the more credible interpretation and is generally championed by those on the political right. One of the prominent revisionists in the modern era is Simon Schama.

The commune's leaders did, however, turn the opportunity to their advantage. Chaumette got on a table in the general council to declare that "we now have open war between the rich and the poor" and urged the immediate mobilization of the army revolutionnaire to go into the countryside, uncover the machinations of the malveillants and the riches egoistes, liberate food from their clutches and deliver them to republican punishment. For good measure Herbert added that each battalion should be accompanied by a mobile guillotine. This demand, he said, should be taken to the Convention the following day. Since the commune had also ordered the closure of workshops, it guaranteed that a large turnout would, as on May 31, surround the Convention. And while Robespierre in particular did not care to share his bench with the 'people' he rhetorically embraced from the tribune, the day should not be read as the imposition of sans-culottism on a reluctant and frightened Convention. In fact the occasion was dominated not by the economic crisis but by the shattering news that Toulon had opened the harbour and city to the British fleet commanded by Admiral Hood. This created the atmosphere of patriotic emergency in which Danton and Barere thrived. It was no hard thing, then, to decree that "terror will be the order of the day," since the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety had a shrewd idea that they would be its executors. As enacted on September 5, the armee revolutionnaire was also a long way from being the mass squadrons of republican vengeance. Instead of the great sans-culotte army of a hundred thousand envisaged in the earliest petitions, or the thirty thousand demanded by the Commune, the Convention authorized a force of just six thousand infantrymen and twelve hundred cavalry to operate in the Paris region... It was also, deprived of the kind of summary punitive powers Herbert had anticipated. For the Jacobins it was less a matter of launching a republican mission than exporting some of the most troublesome militants to the countryside and applying force to the crucial issue of food supply for the capital, thus disburdening themselves of two of their most intractable problems at the same time.

(Simon Schama, Revisionist historian in his Book 'Citizens') Additional Source

Simon Schama is a revisionist historian. As a historian he is trying to uncover the truth, meaning he will generally be reliable as he is serving academia. Be that as it may, Schama's style, which is similar to Carlyle's in 'The French Revolution: A History', may exaggerate claims for emphasis as the book is written like a novel to be accessible to the average reader. Nonetheless, the usefulness of the source cannot be understated as Schama argues that the 'imposition of sans-culottism' only has minor relevance in the development of the Terror instead placing greater importance on the threat posed by the foreign powers France was fighting. Effectively, like many revisionists before him, he argues circumstance drove the Terror, that it was no 'republic of virtue' rather a defensive wall against the oncoming tides of counter-revolution and foreign war. Interestingly, unlike other revisionist historians, Schama doesn't downplay the effect of the sans-culotte, claiming the insurrectionary feeling amongst the working class Parisians was "not the unfortunate by-product of revolution but the source of its energy". This difference to other revisionists can be explained by Schama's political beliefs, putting himself on the 'European left' as opposed to the centre-right attitude held by most revisionist historians. In spite of this, he puts forward suggestions arguing the demands of the sans-culottes failed, that the armée révolutionnaire was insignificant in comparison to the size suggested by the earliest popular movements and proposing that instead of being a powerful revolutionary force, they were just a mismatch of troublemakers who the CPS and Revolutionary government wanted to use, continuing with the belief that the sans-culotte were manipulated by the Jacobins to suit Jacobin interests. Furthermore, Schama agrees in principle with Furet, arguing that many historians on the far left of the political spectrum don't necessarily provide objective versions of the revolution, as they are naturally drawn to the ideology behind the revolution and thus, wish to present it in an appealing, positive light.



Overall, it seems Schama recognises the sans-culotte as a potential threat, but refutes the claim they are the main reason for the Terror. Instead placing emphasis on the wars, both internal and external, claiming that the Terror was needed to secure France's safety. Schama argues this war against the counter-revolutionaries and their foreign proponents forced the government to incarcerate those supporting counter-revolution. However prisons soon became overcrowded, so the CPS, showing their ability to adapt to changing circumstances created a Revolutionary Tribunal. One man successful at utilising such an institution was Jean-Baptiste Carrier, one of the most famous representatives on mission.

Dear friend and colleague,

I have just put a letter in the last post to the national convention, detailing the great reforms I have made in Rennes. The most successful measure has been the confiscation of the property of Chapelier, Defermon, Lanjuinais, and of all the counter revolutionaries, and ex-administrators who had tried to escape

...On the day when the latter were dismissed, I read out a list of their crimes to them, as loudly and vehemently as I could, in the presence of the people of Rennes whose shouts of righteous indignation testified to the truth of my accusations. Although they admitted to the charges, they asked me today what their crimes were; they demanded an interrogation and to be given a hearing and judgement. I replied with calm and manly firmness that the great amount of evidence against them, as well as the law relating to suspects, not only made the measures I had taken against them legitimate but actually obligatory. [I also told them] that I was not a judge with the power to interrogate them and give them a hearing, but that if they persisted in demanding a trial, I would give orders for them to be sent to the Revolutionary Tribunal which alone has the power to deal with the crimes of federalism and conspiracy, of which they stood accused. 'Oh but...' they replied...They were then completely silent.

Everywhere the number of salutary arrests is increasing daily. At Saint-Brieuc, at Plouer, at Saint-Servan, at Redon, at Vitre, at Fougères, counter revolutionaries and suspects are being arrested every day. I will send them immediately to the Revolutionary Tribunal. At the same time, I intend in the near future to make up some cargoes of unsworn priests and to intrust them to a sailor from Saint-Servan known for his patriotism.

Farewell, my good friend. My work has caused a remarkable change in my health. I was very ill yesterday. If it were not for being laid low, I would have hastened to Nantes, the source of counter-revolution and a continuous source of energy for the Vendée, where my colleagues have let two popular clubs stay open, one of which is composed entirely of real counter-revolutionaries. It is because of half-measures and a really blameful leniency that we have experienced the recent defeats outside Nantes, which will become a second Lyon if we are not careful.

Greetings, fraternity.

Carrier.

[A letter from Carrier to De Sechelles at the height of the Terror] Additional Source

Carrier's letter tows the line with the revisionist belief, that the counter-revolution was one of the prime reasons for the development of the Terror. Carrier uses the threat of the creation of a 'second Lyon' to justify his extreme methods when dealing with the counter-revolutionaries in Nantes. It's likely the CPS deemed the destruction of the counter-revolutionaries of high importance as they allowed Carrier's sadistic methods to go on for so long (although he was recalled after the mass-drowning of civilians). Jean-Baptiste Carrier was notorious during the revolution for being a vicious and barbaric representative on mission. As he is a representative on mission the source is useful as he carried out the Terror so had a first hand experience. This is a personal letter to his friend so it is likely he believed its content, although he could have exaggerated the threat so it appeared he was doing a better job as he wished to gain favour with the CPS (which De Sechelles was a member of). This could lead to the questioning of reliability as he may have meddled with the truth. Carrier was also influential in the creation of a Revolutionary Tribunal, a mechanism used by the government to assert their dominance and put fear into the hearts of the counter-revolutionaries. This again fits in with the Revisionist belief, held by David Andress who argues "The descent into Terror was not brought about by ruthless leaders striking out at helpless victims, but by men who feared their own immolation driven... by the real threat of aristocratic vengeance".



Critics of this view argue that, if the aim of the Terror was to disperse the counter-revolutionaries, why include an economic Terror as well, why not focus your efforts on the Revolutionary Tribunal? There would be no need for the economic Terror unless there was another cause of the Terror. Therefore the *armee-revolutionnaire* must have had some other motives, as highlighted by the next source.

The Citizen soldiers of the Revolutionary Army still imbued with revolutionary principles, are now stationed at Pontoise and assure you that they have only left Paris and their homes to thwart Intrigue and Aristocracy to the utmost. From the moment we arrived here, we have been occupied in arranging the provisioning of Paris. Several of our comrades, in the course of their duties, have found eggs and butter hidden in cupboards in farmhouses and even grain hidden in barrels.

The very mention of our name makes traitors go pale. For more than three months we have demanded the authority to exercise full surveillance. Our demands have been in vain. Our brother citizens lack everything, and if we do not have sufficient food, it is because the scarcity is only apparent. We ask that we might search households, which we have not done so far, at least only feebly. We ask that the Revolutionary Commissioners send us a true *Sans Culotte*, authorised to override the authority of the local commune. By such means we shall foil the counter-revolutionaries who go unto the countryside and buy up the foodstuffs in order to sell them to the rich and selfish at inflated prices.

We ask that we may be allowed to requisition food and bring it to Paris. We made such a demand to the Commission for provisioning the Republic, but we have had no reply. Now calumny directs its steps towards us; That is why we ask you to give us the chance to prove that we are still Republicans and supporters of the Mountain. We are obliged to tell you that it is the incompetence of the municipal authorities that is the sole cause of the shortage of basic necessities

[From an appeal to the general assembly of the section of the Observatory by a detachment of the Parisian *armee revolutionnaire* (16 March 1794)] In Source Pack

This source, written near the end of the Terror, when the domestic atrocities committed by the government were at their peak, emphasises the demands of the *sans-culotte*; wanting to be able to 'requisition food' and 'exercise full surveillance'. However, they feel as if their demands are being ignored as for 'three months' they have asked to be able to exercise the surveillance and the Convention have not complied, suggesting that the appeasement of the *sans-culotte* was not the main priority of the Terror since had their demands been integral they would have been awarded as soon as the demand was made. Nonetheless, the letter is written by the *armee revolutionnaire*, whose mission is to catch hoarders, which is the fulfilment of an idea aimed at conciliating the *sans-culottes*. The source itself argues that the demands of the *sans-culotte* must be met so as to flush out the counter-revolutionaries, again putting the security of the republic ahead of their own personal demands. Even so, it's likely that many of the *armee revolutionnaire* thought that as soon as the internal and external wars were won, their demands would be met, having been under the illusion that their demands were the foundation of the republic. As Peter Mcphee states "The central purpose of the Terror was to institute the emergency and draconian measures necessary at the time of military crisis" and it just so happened that the *sans-culotte* were ideally placed to become a force used by the government, in return for empty promises they had no intention of fulfilling.

Some Marxist historians would argue that as victory and stability could not be assured without the compliance of the sans-culottes, making sure they knew they were vital to the republic was a priority so they would be willing to sacrifice for the republic. Therefore it can be argued the demands of the sans-culotte developed the Terror, but evidence suggests it's hard to say they caused the Terror. However, for the Terror to advance, the execution of their demands was necessary. Despite his Marxist background, Richard Cobb disagrees with this view, arguing the sans-culotte were insignificant.

The sans-culottes could afford to be noisily bellicose and demonstratively patriotic. They were mostly beyond military age and in little danger unless they belonged to skilled trades of use to national defence, of being sent way from home, much less to win the war, but from a distance. Unlike Jacobinism sans-culottisme was not outward-looking or exportable. The frontiers of sans-culottisme were often confined to a single commune and it was difficult to link up the efforts of even those in two neighbouring towns. It is not surprising that it did not have an international audience. Counter-revolutionary Europe made no distinction between sans-culottisme and Jacobinism. The Sans-culottes might never have existed

[Richard Cobb, a British academic historian and specialist on the French Revolutionary Period, writing in *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820* (1970)] Source Pack

Cobb, a leftwing historian who specialised on the French Revolution argued the sans-culotte were all show and no substance, that difficulty in unifying the sans-culotte hindered the strength of their demands as it left them unable to successfully coerce government into implementing their demands. This source is a direct contradiction to Sobouls belief, showing the spectrum of the debate regarding their significance. Cobb spent a substantial amount of time independently researching in the French archives meaning his views are reliable and useful. Cobb believes the development of the Terror was a result of the need to secure victory in both the internal and external wars rather than an appeasement of the urban labourers. Cobb also proposes that members of the CPS were trying to fulfill their political desires - using the Terror as an excuse to try and reach their political utopia. However, one should be sceptical about this belief as over time radicalism lost influence over the CPS. This loosening of grip by radicalism was so extreme that many far left factions were actually executed, leaving the sans-culotte without stable leadership or direction meaning their influence (if we assume they had any to start with) slowly ebbed away. Cobb also argues that if they even existed, the majority of the sans-culotte were filled with rhetoric as they were largely uninvolved in the conflict. Cobb proposes that sans-culottisme ideas varied from commune to commune, and so to put them all under an umbrella term vastly simplifies the differences of ideology within the sans-culotte.



In conclusion, it must be noted that the demands of the sans-culotte had some bearing on the course of the Terror and its development. But, it must be understood that their demands only really provided for an economic Terror with demands such as general maximum on personal wealth and capital punishment for hoarders. It must also be emphasised that the belief that their demands were the main cause of the Terror is narrowminded and in reality probably ideologically driven. It is at best a secondary cause used to win over the sans-culotte so that the armee-revolutionnaire (constituting of mainly sans-culottes) would fulfill their role with vigour in both the internal and external wars. If we follow the thought track of Furet and Cobban then even as a secondary domestic cause the scope of the sans-culotte was limited due to the decline of the assignat and the recovery of an economic slump must have been more important to the CPS than the appeasement of a section of society and thus the restrictions had to be imposed anyway to secure the wellbeing of the nation. The wars, internal and external, had merged with situations like the handing over of Toulon to the British and the support of the foreign powers to those in the Vendee and therefore the suppression of this dual threat was the main priority of the revolutionary government. The government were attempting to secure France's borders from the 'tyrants' who wanted to instill 'despotic governments' but logically, when conflict is on so many fronts it is important to secure the support of those already on your side. Thus minor appeasement is not only necessary but vital for the success of Revolutionary France. So, overall, the demands of the sans-culotte were not the main factor in the development of the Terror, but a coincidental byproduct of the government fulfilling their other aims.

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